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1 Introduction
In the wake of the Great Recession, there were renewed concerns that the severe
economic crisis could fuel a resurgence in crime (see Colvi, 2009, for example). These
concerns echoed ideas dating back to the Great Depression of the 1930s and recent discus-
sions about the relationship between economic crises, more broadly, and crime (Fishback
et al., 2010; UNODC, 2012). The literature on economic cycles, labor market conditions,
and crime has recurrently investigated these issues, but identiﬁcation challenges remain
open (e.g. Cook and Zarkin, 1985; Raphael and Winter-Ebmer, 2001; Finklea, 2011). De-
spite its relevance in the public debate and important welfare implications, there is no
general agreement regarding the eﬀect of economic shocks on criminal activity, and even
less about the mechanisms through which these eﬀects may play out.
This paper sheds light on the eﬀect of economic conditions on crime by exploiting local
economic shocks brought about by the Brazilian trade liberalization episode. Between
1990 and 1995, Brazil implemented a large-scale unilateral trade liberalization that had
heterogeneous eﬀects on local economies across the country. Regions initially specialized
in industries exposed to larger tari ﬀ cuts experienced deteriorations in labor market
conditions relative to the national average (Kovak, 2013; Dix-Carneiro and Kovak, 2015b).
Brazil's trade liberalization had a unique feature: it was close to a once-and-for-all event,
with tariﬀ s being reduced between 1990 and 1995, and remaining approximately constant
afterwards. This allows us to empirically characterize the dynamic response of crime rates
to the trade-induced regional economic shocks. It also allows us to explore the timing of
the responses of potential mechanisms and to assess their relevance in explaining the
observed response of crime.
The Brazilian context is particularly appealing because it is characterized by high
incidence of crime. In 2012, the United Nations Oﬃce on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
ranked Brazil as the number one country worldwide in absolute number of homicides,
with over 50,000 occurrences per year, and 18th in homicide rates, with 25.2 homicides
per 100,000 inhabitants. The Economist magazine recently compiled a list of the world's 50
most violent metropolises (cities with populations of 250,000 or more), and 32 of them are
located in the country.1 Brazil also shares many common features with other countries in
Latin America and the Caribbean. According to the UNODC, among the 20 most violent
countries in the world, 14 are located in the region. These countries have in common
as well many other socioeconomic characteristics, such as poor labor market conditions,
ineﬀective educational systems, and high levels of inequality. One could therefore expect
economic shocks to have more severe eﬀects on crime, with potentially larger welfare
1http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/03/daily-chart-18
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implications, in such settings.
Our empirical strategy investigates how crime rates evolved in each local economy as
liberalization took place, tracing out its eﬀects over the medium- and long-run horizons.
In order to do so, we construct a measure of trade-induced shocks to local economies based
on changes in sector-speciﬁc tariﬀs and on the initial sectoral composition of employment
in each region, using the methodology proposed by Topalova (2010) and rationalized and
reﬁned by Kovak (2013). We refer to these trade-induced shocks as regional tariﬀ changes
throughout the rest of the paper. We measure crime using homicide data compiled by
the Brazilian Ministry of Health, which are the only crime data that can be consistently
compared across regions of the country for extended periods of time.2
We start by analyzing the direct eﬀect of regional tariﬀ changes on crime. Our reduced-
form results indicate that regions facing larger trade-induced shocks experienced relative
increases in crime rates starting in 1995, immediately after the trade reform was complete,
and continued experiencing relatively higher crime growth for the following eight years.
Before 1995 and after 2003, there is no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of the trade reform
on crime. Our placebo exercises show that region-speciﬁc trends in crime before the
reform were uncorrelated with the (future) trade-induced shocks. This pattern conﬁrms
that our results are capturing causal eﬀects of the trade-induced shocks on crime. The
baseline speciﬁcation indicates that a region facing a reduction in tariﬀs of 0.1 log point
(corresponding to a movement from the 90th to the 10th percentile of regional tariﬀ
changes) experienced a relative increase in its crime rate of 0.38 log point (46 percent)
ﬁve years after liberalization was complete.
Having established the direct eﬀect of these local economic shocks on crime, we move
to analyze through which mechanisms these eﬀects may have played out. We focus on
three sets of factors that have been linked to crime and violence by the existing literature:
(i) labor market conditions such as employment rates and earnings (Raphael and Winter-
Ebmer, 2001; Gould et al., 2002; Lin, 2008; Fougère et al., 2009); (ii) public goods provision
(Levitt, 1997; Schargrodsky and di Tella, 2004; Jacob and Lefgren, 2003; Lochner and
Moretti, 2004; Foley, 2011); and (iii) mental health (stress or depression) and inequality
(Fajnzylber et al., 2002; Bourguignon et al., 2003; Card and Dahl, 2011; Fazel et al., 2015).
First, we show that regions specialized in industries exposed to larger reductions in
tariﬀs experienced a deterioration in labor market conditions (employment and earnings)
relative to the national average in the medium run (1991-2000), followed by a partial
recovery in the long run (1991-2010). The dynamic proﬁle of this labor market response
2Section 3 and Appendix A provide evidence that homicide rates are a good proxy for the overall
incidence of crime in Brazil. In addition, in the context of developing countries where underreporting is
prevalent and non-random, data on homicides provide less biased measures of the changes in crime and
violence (Soares, 2004).
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closely mirrors that observed for crime rates.3 Next, we show that the initial deteriora-
tion in labor market conditions was accompanied by other signs of contraction in economic
activity, including plant closure, reduced formal wage bill, and reduced government rev-
enues. These dimensions are relevant because they directly aﬀect a local government's
tax base and therefore may hinder its ability to provide public goods, which may aﬀect
crime. Indeed, we ﬁnd that regions more exposed to tariﬀ reductions also experienced
relative declines in government spending and in public safety personnel, and increases in
share of youth (14 to 18 years old) out of school. However, these impacts persisted and
were ampliﬁed in the long run, in contrast with the recovery observed in labor market
conditions as well as in crime rates. Our results also show that there were no signiﬁcant
eﬀects on suicide rates, indicating that mental health and depression do not seem to have
played an important role in the response of crime we document. This is an important
result, given that we measure criminal activity using homicide rates. Finally, we show
that inequality followed a similar path to that observed for the provision of public goods:
more exposure to foreign competition was associated with increases in inequality in the
medium run, which were ampliﬁed in the long run.
The eﬀect of trade shocks on crime follows the same dynamic pattern as the eﬀect on
labor market conditions, and both are very diﬀerent from the dynamic responses observed
for public goods provision and inequality. This suggests that the labor market channel is
essential to understand how local crime rates responded to this shock. We formalize this
argument using an empirical framework in which we assume a stable long-run relationship
between crime and its determinants, but the response of these determinants to the one-
time trade shock may evolve over time (as it is the case). Next, we argue that, by imposing
theoretical sign restrictions on the eﬀects of these determinants, one cannot reproduce the
observed dynamic eﬀects of trade shocks on crime without attributing a major role to labor
market variables, in particular to the employment rate.
Based on this framework, we develop a strategy to estimate bounds for the eﬀect of
labor market conditions on crime. Our methodological innovation shows that one can
exploit the distinct dynamic eﬀects of a single shock to achieve partial identiﬁcation. The
preferred estimates from our baseline speciﬁcation lead to lower and upper bounds for
the elasticity of crime with respect to the employment rate of, respectively, -5.6 and -4.5,
both statistically signiﬁcant. These imply that if a region experiences a 10-year decline in
its employment rate of one standard deviation (0.07 log point), the crime rate would be
expected to increase between 0.32 and 0.39 log point (37 and 48 percent). This is a large
economic eﬀect: it represents an increase equivalent to half a standard deviation of the
3Consistent with previous ﬁndings of Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2015b), the long-run recovery in em-
ployment reﬂects increases in informal employment, while formal employment never recovers.
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distribution of changes in crime rates across regions between 1991 and 2000. These bounds
also indicate that labor market conditions account for 75 to 93 percent of the medium-run
eﬀect of the trade-induced economic shocks on crime and constitute the main mechanism
through which liberalization aﬀected crime.
According to our framework and theoretical restrictions, the long-run recovery in crime
rates in harder hit locations was driven by the recovery in employment rates. In earlier
work, Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2015b) ﬁnd that the long-run recovery in employment
rates in harder hit locations is entirely driven by an expansion of the informal sector 
employment in the formal sector never recovers. Therefore, informal employment seems to
have been able to keep individuals away from crime. This result suggests that enforcement
of labor regulations that tend to reduce informality but increase unemployment may
exacerbate the response of crime to economic downturns.
This paper contributes to the literature in three dimensions. First, we provide credible
estimates of the eﬀect of economic shocks on criminal activity and make progress in
understanding the mechanisms behind this eﬀect. Second, we contribute to a recent but
growing literature stressing adjustment costs to trade shocks beyond those associated
with the labor market.4 The fact that crime has an important externality dimension
adds particular interest to this point, since it means that the socioeconomic implications
of trade shocks go beyond the costs and beneﬁts incurred by the individuals directly
aﬀected by them. Finally, the paper contributes to the literature on the eﬀects of labor
market conditions on crime (Raphael and Winter-Ebmer, 2001; Gould et al., 2002; Lin,
2008; Fougère et al., 2009). In contrast to the Bartik shocks typically used as local labor
demand shifters in this literature, we know precisely the source of the shock (changes in
import tariﬀs), providing a more transparent source of exogenous variation.5 Our results
suggest that these Bartik shocks are unlikely to satisfy the exclusion restriction required
by an instrumental variables estimator. The combination of our natural experiment with
our empirical strategy allows us to make progress relative to the previous literature and
to provide bounds on the eﬀect of local labor market conditions on crime. This is only
possible because the shock captures an event that is discrete in time and permanent,
which allows us to exploit the evolution of its eﬀects over time.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a background
of the 1990s trade liberalization in Brazil and of its documented eﬀect on local labor
4For example, recent studies have estimated the eﬀects of trade shocks on crime (Iyer and Topalova,
2014; Che and Xu, 2016; Deiana, 2016), the provision of public goods (Feler and Senses, 2016), health
and mortality (McManus and Schaur, 2016; Pierce and Schott, 2016), household structure (Autor et al.,
2015) and political outcomes (Dippel et al., 2015; Autor et al., 2016; Che et al., 2016).
5Bartik (1991) predicts changes in local labor demand based on national changes in industry-speciﬁc
employment and wages and on each region's initial industrial structure. This procedure is widely used in
labor economics to construct instruments for shifts in local labor demand.
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markets. Section 3 describes the data we use and provides descriptive statistics. Section
4 presents our empirical strategy and the results related to the eﬀect of the trade-induced
regional shocks on crime. Section 5 sheds light on the mechanisms behind the relationship
between the trade shocks and crime. Section 6 relates our paper to the literature on labor
market conditions and crime. Finally, Section 7 closes the paper with a broader discussion
and interpretation of the results.
2 Trade Liberalization and Local Economic Shocks in Brazil
2.1 The Brazilian Trade Liberalization
Starting in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Brazil undertook a major unilateral trade
liberalization process which was fully implemented between 1990 and 1995. The trade
reform broke with nearly one hundred years of very high barriers to trade, which were
part of a deliberate import substitution policy. Nominal tariﬀs were not only high, but also
did not represent the de facto protection faced by industries, since there was a complex
and non-transparent structure of additional regulations. There were 42 special regimes
allowing tariﬀ reductions or exemptions, tariﬀ redundancies, and widespread use of non-
tariﬀ barriers (quotas, lists of banned products, red tape), as well as various additional
taxes (Kume et al., 2003). During the 1988-1989 period, tariﬀ redundancy, special regimes,
and additional taxes were partially eliminated. This constituted a ﬁrst move toward
a more transparent system, where tariﬀs actually reﬂected the structure of protection.
However, up to that point, there was no signiﬁcant change in the level of protection faced
by Brazilian producers (Kume et al., 2003).
Trade liberalization eﬀectively started in March 1990, when the newly elected president
unexpectedly eliminated non-tariﬀ barriers (e.g. suspended import licenses and special
customs regime), often immediately replacing them with higher import tariﬀs in a process
known as tariﬃcation (tariﬁcação, see de Carvalho, Jr., 1992). Although this change left
the eﬀective protection system unaltered, it left tariﬀs as the main trade policy instrument.
Thus, starting in 1990, tariﬀs accurately reﬂected the level of protection faced by Brazilian
ﬁrms across industries. Consequently, the tariﬀ reductions observed between 1990 and
1995 provide a good measure of the extent and depth of the trade liberalization episode.6
Nominal tariﬀ cuts were very large in some industries and the average tariﬀ fell from
30.5 percent in 1990 to 12.8 percent in 1995.7 Figure 1 shows the approximate percentage
6Changes in tariﬀs after 1995 were trivial compared to the changes that occurred between 1990 and
1995. See discussion in Appendix B.
7We focus on changes in output tariﬀs to construct our measure of trade-induced local labor demand
shocks (or regional tariﬀ changes), to be formally deﬁned in the next Section. An alternative would be to
use eﬀective rates of protection, which include information on both input and output tariﬀs, measuring
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change in sectoral prices induced by changes in tariﬀs (we plot the change in the log of one
plus tariﬀs in the ﬁgure, since this is the measure of tariﬀ changes used in our empirical
analysis).8 Importantly, there was ample variation in tariﬀ cuts across sectors, which will
be essential to our identiﬁcation strategy. The tariﬀ data we use throughout this paper
are provided by Kume et al. (2003), and have been extensively used in the literature on
trade and labor markets in Brazil.
Figure 1: Changes in log(1 + tariﬀ), 1990-1995
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Source: Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2015b).
Finally, tariﬀ cuts were almost perfectly correlated with pre-liberalization tariﬀ levels
(correlation coeﬃcient of -0.90), as sectors with initially higher tariﬀs experienced larger
subsequent reductions. This led not only to a reduction in the average tariﬀ, but also to
a homogenization of tariﬀs: the standard deviation of tariﬀs fell from 14.9 percent to 7.4
percent over the period. Baseline tariﬀs reﬂected the level of protection deﬁned decades
earlier (in 1957, see Kume et al., 2003), so this pattern lessens concerns regarding the
political economy of tariﬀ reduction, as sectoral and regional idiosyncrasies seem to be
almost entirely absent (see Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2003; Pavcnik et al., 2004; Goldberg
and Pavcnik, 2007, for discussions). We revisit this point when performing robustness
the eﬀect of the entire tariﬀ structure on value added per unit of output in each industry. At the level
of aggregation used in this paper, the ﬁnest possible level that makes the industry classiﬁcation of Kume
et al. (2003)'s tariﬀs compatible with the 1991 Demographic Census, 1990-1995 changes in input tariﬀs are
almost perfectly correlated with changes in output tariﬀs. Consequently, regional tariﬀ changes computed
using changes in output tariﬀs and using changes in eﬀective rates of protection are also almost perfectly
correlated (the correlation is greater than 0.99 when we use the eﬀective rates of protection calculated
by Kume et al. (2003)). Conducting the analysis using changes in output tariﬀs or eﬀective rates of
protection has little to no eﬀect on any of the results of this paper.
8The price of good j, Pj , is given by Pj = P
∗
j (1 + τj), where P
∗
j is the international market price
of good j and τj is the import tariﬀ imposed on that good. Under a small open economy assumption,
∆ log (Pj) = ∆ log (1 + τj).
6
exercises in the results section.
2.2 Trade-Induced Local Economic Shocks
Our measure of local economic shocks follows the empirical literature on regional labor
market eﬀects of foreign competition, which exploits the fact that regions within a country
often specialize in the production of diﬀerent goods. In addition to diﬀerent specialization
patterns of production across space, trade shocks aﬀect industries in varying degrees.
Therefore, the interaction between sector-speciﬁc trade shocks and sectoral composition
at the regional level provides a measure of trade-induced shocks to local labor demand.
For example, tariﬀs in Apparel fell from 51.1 percent to 19.8 percent between 1990 and
1995, whereas tariﬀs in Agriculture increased from 5.9 percent to 7.4 percent over the
same period. In the presence of substantial barriers to mobility across regions, we would
expect that economic conditions would have deteriorated more in regions more specialized
in harder-hit sectors.
Although the idea above was initially introduced by Topalova (2010), Kovak (2013)
formalized and reﬁned it in the context of a speciﬁc-factors model. We follow Kovak
(2013) and deﬁne our local economic shock as the Regional Tariﬀ Change in region r,
which eﬀectively measures by how much trade liberalization aﬀected labor demand in the
region. RTCr is the average tariﬀ change faced by region r, weighted by the importance
of each sector in regional employment. Formally:
RTCr =
∑
i∈T
ψri∆ log (1 + τi) , with
ψri =
λri
ϕi∑
j∈T
λrj
ϕj
,
where τi is the tariﬀ on industry i, λri is the initial share of region r workers employed in
industry i, ϕi equals one minus the wage bill share of industry i, and T denotes the set of
all tradable industries (manufacturing, agriculture and mining). One of the advantages of
the treatment in Kovak (2013) is that it explicitly shows how to incorporate non-tradable
sectors into the analysis. Because non-tradable output must be consumed within the
region where it is produced, non-tradable prices move together with prices of locally-
produced tradable goods. Therefore, the magnitude of the trade-induced regional shock
depends only on how the local tradable sector is aﬀected (see Kovak, 2013, for further
discussion and details).
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3 Data
3.1 Local Economies
We conduct our analysis at the micro-region level, which is a grouping of economically
integrated contiguous municipalities with similar geographic and productive characteris-
tics. Micro-regions closely parallel the notion of local economies and have been widely used
as the units of analysis in the literature on the local labor market eﬀects of trade liberaliza-
tion in Brazil (Kovak, 2013; Costa et al., 2015; Dix-Carneiro and Kovak, 2015a,b; Hirata
and Soares, 2015).9 Although the Brazilian Statistical Agency IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro
de Geograﬁa e Estatística) periodically constructs mappings between municipalities and
micro-regions, we adapt these mappings given that municipalities change boundaries and
are created and extinguished over time. Therefore, we aggregate municipalities to obtain
minimally comparable areas (Reis et al., 2008) and construct micro-regions that are con-
sistently identiﬁable from 1980 to 2010. This process leads to a set of 411 local economies,
as in Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2015a) and Costa et al. (2015).10 Table 1 provides de-
scriptive statistics at the micro-region level for the main variables used in our empirical
analysis. The respective data sources are discussed in the following sections.
3.2 Crime
We use homicide rates computed from mortality records as a proxy for the overall
incidence of crime. These records come from DATASUS (Departamento de Informática
do Sistema Único de Saúde), an administrative dataset from the Ministry of Health that
contains detailed information on deaths by external causes classiﬁed according to the
International Statistical Classiﬁcation of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD).11
We use annual data aggregated to the micro-region level from 1980 to 2010.12
Both the homicide rate and the total number of homicides have increased substantially
9A potential concern in this context would be commuting across micro-regions. But note that only
3.2 and 4.6 percent of workers lived and worked in diﬀerent micro-regions in, respectively, 2000 and 2010.
10The micro-regions we use in this paper are slightly more aggregated versions than the ones in Kovak
(2013) and Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2015b) who use minimally comparable areas over shorter periods
(1991 to 2000 and 1991 to 2010, respectively). As in these other papers, we drop the region containing
the free trade zone of Manaus, since it was exempt from tariﬀs and unaﬀected by the tariﬀ changes that
occurred during the 1990s trade liberalization.
11The ICD is published by the World Health Organization. It changed in 1996, but the series remain
comparable. From 1980 through 1995, we use the ICD-9 (categories E960-E969) and from 1996 through
2010 we use the ICD-10 (categories X85-Y09).
12Since our econometric speciﬁcations make use of changes in logs of crime rates, we add one to the
number of homicides in each region to avoid sample selection issues that would arise from dropping regions
with no reported homicides in at least one year. We obtain nearly identical results when we do not add
one to the number of homicides in each region. We also obtain very similar results if our measure of
homicides in region r and year t is given by an average of homicides between years t − 1 and t. In that
case, only four regions are excluded from the regressions due to zeros.
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over the past 30 years in Brazil, with the homicide rate in 2010 being more than 2.5 times
higher than in 1980, while the total number of homicides increased ﬁve-fold, from around
10,000 to 50,000 deaths per year. These numbers put Brazil in the ﬁrst place worldwide
in terms of number of homicides and in 18th place in terms of homicide rates (UNODC,
2013). The dispersion of homicide rates across micro-regions is also high: the 10th and
90th percentiles of the distribution corresponded to, respectively, 2.5 and 30 in 1991, and
2.9 and 34 in 2000.
In Figure 2, Panel (a), we show how log-changes in crime rates between 1991 and 2000
(∆91−00 log (CRr)) are distributed across local economies. Since we will be contrasting
changes in the log of local crime rates to regional tariﬀ changes (RTCr), Figure 2 also
presents the distribution of RTCr across micro-regions (Panel (b)). It shows that there
is a large degree of heterogeneity in changes in homicide rates and trade-induced shocks
across regions.
One potential concern with the use of homicides to represent the overall incidence of
crime is that less extreme forms of violence are typically more prevalent. In addition,
economic crimes might seem more adequate categories to analyze the response of crime to
deteriorations in economic conditions. Unfortunately, in the case of Brazil, police records
are not compiled systematically in a comparable way at the municipality (or micro-region)
level. Even for the very few states that do provide statistics at more disaggregate levels,
the available series start only in the early 2000s, many years after the trade liberalization
period and, therefore, are not suitable for our analysis. For these reasons, homicides
recorded by the health system are the only type of crime that can be followed over extended
periods of time and across all regions of the country. Homicides are also considered more
reliable crime statistics in the context of developing countries, where underreporting of
less serious oﬀenses tends to be non-random and widespread (Soares, 2004).
Nevertheless, we explicitly address this concern using data from the states of São
Paulo and Minas Gerais for the period between 2001 and 2011. These are the two most
populous states in Brazil, comprising 32 percent of the total population, and they provide
disaggregated police compiled statistics since the early 2000s for certain types of crime.
Appendix A presents correlations between levels and changes in crime rates in 5-year
windows between 2001 and 2011 for São Paulo and Minas Gerais, for four types of crime:
homicides recorded by the health system (our dependent variable), homicides recorded
by the police, violent crimes against the person (excluding homicides), and violent prop-
erty crimes.13 We focus on violent crimes since these are supposed to suﬀer less from
13Violent property crimes refer to robberies in both states. Violent crimes against the person refer to
rape in São Paulo and to rape, assaults, and attempted homicides in Minas Gerais. The data are provided
by the statistical agencies of the two states (Fundação SEADE for São Paulo and Fundação João Pinheiro
for Minas Gerais).
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underreporting bias. Our measure of homicides is highly correlated, both in levels and in
(5-year) changes, to police-recorded homicides, to property crimes, and to crimes against
the person. This pattern is similar if we consider 1- or 10-year intervals as well (Tables
A.2 and A.3), or if we condition on time and micro-region ﬁxed eﬀects (Tables A.4 and
A.5). At the level of micro-regions in Brazil, homicide rates seem indeed to be a good
proxy for the overall incidence of crime.
The strong correlations between homicides and other types of crime reﬂect the fact that
property crime and drug traﬃcking in Brazil are usually undertaken by armed individuals,
and homicides sometimes arise as collateral damage of these activities. Violence is also
typically used as a way to settle disputes among agents operating in illegal markets and
among common criminals (Chimeli and Soares, 2016). Even though there are no oﬃcial
statistics on the motivations behind homicides in Brazil, available ethnographic evidence
suggest that at least 40 percent of homicides in urban areas  and possibly much more
 are likely to be linked to typical economic crimes (e.g. robberies) and to illegal drug
traﬃcking (Lima, 2000; Sapori et al., 2012).
3.3 Other Variables
We use four waves of the Brazilian Demographic Census covering thirty years (1980
2010) to compute several variables of interest. First, we use the Census to construct
the two main labor market outcomes at the individual level, namely, total labor market
earnings and employment status (employed or not employed). We also use individual-
level data to estimate per capita household income inequality and socio-demographic
characteristics (education, age, and urban location) when necessary. In addition, we use
the Census data to estimate the number of workers employed in occupations related to
public safety in each region. These consist of jobs in the civil and military police as well
as security guards. Appendix C explains in further detail other treatments we apply to
some variables extracted from the Census.
We obtain annual spending and revenue for local government from the Ministry of
Finance (Ministério da Fazenda  Secretaria do Tesouro Nacional).14 Finally, we use the
RAIS data set (Registro Anual de Informações Sociais) to compute the number of formal
establishments and the formal wage bill for each micro-region. RAIS is an administrative
data set collected by the Ministry of Labor covering the universe of formal ﬁrms and
workers. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for our main variables at the micro-region
level.
14The data goes back to 1985 but it is often unreliable, partly because of measurement error due to
hyperinﬂation and frequent missing information. For this reason we focus on data after Brazil stabilized
its currency, that is, from 1994 onwards.
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Figure 2: Log-Changes in Local Crime Rates and Regional Tariﬀ Changes
(a) Distribution of Log-Changes in Local Crime Rates: 19912000
(b) Distribution of Regional Tariﬀ Changes, RTCr
Source: Crime rates correspond to homicide rates per 100,000 inhabitants computed from DATASUS
(Departamento de Informática do Sistema Único de Saúde). Regional tariﬀ changes, RTCr, computed
according to the formulae in Section 2.2.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics at the Micro-Region Level
Variable Source
1991 2000 2010
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Crime Rate (per 100,000 inhabitants) DataSUS 14.2 10.7 15.8 13.1 22.4 14.5
Suicide Rate (per 100,000 inhabitants) DataSUS 4.1 3.0 4.7 3.2 6.3 3.2
Real Monthly Earnings (2010 R$) Census 754.9 338.4 920.0 372.6 992.3 332.1
Employment Rate Census 0.60 0.05 0.60 0.06 0.64 0.08
Share Young (18 to 30 years old) Census 0.22 0.02 0.23 0.01 0.23 0.02
Share Unskilled, ≥ 18 years Census 0.48 0.04 0.47 0.04 0.45 0.05
Share Young, Unskilled and Male Census 0.09 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.06 0.02
Share Urban Census 0.61 0.20 0.68 0.18 0.73 0.17
Public Safety Personnel (per 100,000 inhabitants) Census 614 332 709 341 761 331
High School Dropouts Census 0.55 0.09 0.32 0.06 0.26 0.04
Gini (Household Income per Capita) Census 0.55 0.04 0.56 0.04 0.52 0.04
Population Census 353,130 929,562 407,750 1,046,677 457,060 1,143,856
Gov. Spending per Capita (Annual, 2010 R$) ∗ Finance Ministry 342.4 182.8 820.9 331.5 1,061.0 319.0
Gov. Revenue per Capita (Annual, 2010 R$) ∗ Finance Ministry 325.1 161.2 862.9 348.5 1,632.8 556.7
Formal Wage Bill per Capita (Annualized, 2010 R$) RAIS and Census 778.2 976.4 1,299.1 1,365.4 2,743.2 2,442.2
Number of Formal Establishments RAIS 3,050 12,709 5,015 16,569 7,197 21,597
Notes: Data on 411 micro-regions. Crime rates are computed as homicide rates per 100,000 inhabitants; suicide rates are also computed
per 100,000 inhabitants; the share of unskilled individuals is computed as the fraction of individuals in the population who have completed
middle school or less and are 18 years old or more; the share of public safety personnel corresponds to the fraction of the population working
in public safety jobs (military and civil police, security guards); high school dropouts corresponds to the share of 1418 year old children who
are not in school; the formal wage bill for each region sums all December formal labor earnings of each year (and annualizes it multiplying by
12 months).
∗ Due to data quality issues, we use government spending and revenue information starting in 1994 (see text). For these variables, 1994 values
are reported in the 1991 column.
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4 Local Trade Shocks and Crime Rates
This section investigates if the local economic shocks brought about by the Brazilian
trade liberalization translated into changes in crime rates. Given that the trade shock
we exploit is discrete in time and permanent, we follow the methodology proposed by
Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2015b) and empirically describe the evolution of the response
of crime to regional tariﬀ changes. In Section 5, we exploit the dynamic response of crime
to help distinguishing the channels through which these eﬀects propagated.
4.1 Medium- and Long-Run Eﬀects
A unique feature of Brazil's trade liberalization is that it was close to a once-and-for-all
event: tariﬀs were reduced between 1990 and 1995, but remained approximately constant
afterwards. This allows us to empirically characterize the dynamic response of crime
rates to the trade-induced regional economic shocks. We use the following speciﬁcation
to compare the evolution of crime rates in regions facing larger tariﬀ reductions to those
in regions facing smaller tariﬀ declines:
log (CRr,t)− log (CRr,1991) = ξt + θtRTCr + r,t, (1)
where CRr,t is the crime rate in region r at time t > 1991.15 In all speciﬁcations we
cluster standard errors at the meso-region level to account for potential spatial correlation
in outcomes across neighboring regions.16,17
Table 2 presents estimates from equation (1) analyzing the medium-run eﬀect, θ̂2000,
of the trade-induced local shocks on crime. We start in column 1 with a speciﬁcation
that corresponds to a univariate regression relating log-changes in local homicide rates to
regional tariﬀ changes, without additional controls and without weighting observations.
There is a signiﬁcant negative relationship between changes in homicide rates and regional
tariﬀ changes, indicating that regions that faced larger exposure to foreign competition
(more negative RTCr) also experienced increases in crime rates relative to the national
average. In column 2, we follow most of the literature on crime and health and weight
the same speciﬁcation from column 1 by the average population between 1991 and 2000,
with little noticeable change in the results.18
In column 3, we add state ﬁxed eﬀects to the speciﬁcation from column 2 (27 ﬁxed
eﬀects, corresponding to 26 states plus the federal district), to account for state-level
15We use 1991, instead of 1990, as the starting point because the former was a Census year. In the
next section, we use Census data to analyze the response of the potential mechanisms to the trade shock
and we want these two sets of results to be directly comparable. This choice is inconsequential for the
results we report.
16Meso-regions are groupings of micro-regions and are deﬁned by the Brazilian Statistical Agency
IBGE. Note that we also need to aggregate a few IBGE meso-regions to make them consistent over the
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Table 2: Regional Tariﬀ Changes and Log-Changes in Local Crime Rates: 19912000
Dep. Var.: ∆91−00 log (CRr) OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RTCr -1.976** -2.444*** -3.838*** -3.769*** -3.853***
(0.822) (0.723) (1.426) (1.365) (1.403)
∆80−91 log (CRr) -0.303*** 0.0683
(0.0749) (0.129)
State Fixed Eﬀects No No Yes Yes Yes
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic 54.2
Observations 411 411 411 411 411
R-squared 0.013 0.052 0.346 0.406 
Notes: DATASUS data. Standard errors (in parentheses) adjusted for 91 meso-region clusters. Unit
of analysis r is a micro-region. Columns: (1) Observations are not weighted; (2) Observations are
weighted by population; (3) Adds state ﬁxed eﬀects to (2); (4) Adds pre-trends to (3); (5) Two-Stage
Least Squares, with an instrument for ∆80−91 log (CRr) (see text).
Signiﬁcant at the *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent level.
changes potentially driven by state-speciﬁc policies.19,20 The magnitude of the coeﬃcient
increases by more than 50 percent and remains strongly signiﬁcant. This indicates that
some of the states that faced greater exposure to foreign competition following liberaliza-
tion also displayed other time varying characteristics that contributed to reduce crime,
initially biasing the coeﬃcient toward zero.
In columns 4 and 5 we estimate the same speciﬁcation from column 3, but controlling
for log-changes in local homicide rates between 1980 and 1991. This speciﬁcation addresses
concerns about pre-existing trends in region-speciﬁc crime rates that could be correlated
with (future) trade-induced local shocks. In column 4 we include this variable as an
additional control and estimate the equation by OLS. A potential problem with this
procedure is that the log of 1991 crime rates appears both in the right and left hand side of
the estimating equation, potentially introducing a mechanical bias and contaminating all
of the remaining coeﬃcients. We address this problem in column 5, where we instrument
pre-existing trends ∆80−91 log (CRr) with log
(
Total Homicidesr,1990
Total Homicidesr,1980
)
. In either case, there is
very little change in the coeﬃcient of interest, indicating that the estimated relationship
1980-2010 period.
17In practice, we estimate equation (1) year by year.
18In the health literature, the realized mortality rate from a certain condition is often seen as an
estimator for the underlying mortality probability. The variance of this estimator is inversely proportional
to population size (see, for example, Deschenes and Moretti, 2009 and Burgess et al., 2014).
19By constitutional mandate, several policies and institutions in Brazil are decentralized to state gov-
ernments (for example, public security, and part of the justice system, and of health and educational
policies). Therefore, controlling for state ﬁxed eﬀects accounts for these unobserved policies, which are
likely to be correlated with local economic conditions.
20By adding state ﬁxed eﬀects, we exploit variation in RTCr across micro-regions within states.
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between changes in crime rates and regional tariﬀ changes is not driven by pre-existing
trends.
The eﬀect of regional tariﬀ changes on crime rates is considerable. Moving a region
from the 90th percentile to the 10th percentile of the distribution of regional tariﬀ changes
means a change in RTCr equivalent to -0.1 log point. Column 3 of Table 2 predicts that
this movement would be accompanied by an increase in crime rates of 0.38 log point,
or 46 percent. To put this eﬀect into perspective, note that the standard deviation of
∆91−00 log (CRr) across regions is of 0.7 log point, so an increase in crime rates of 0.38 log
point is equivalent to an increase of approximately half a standard deviation in decadal
changes in log crime rates.
Table 3 reproduces the same exercises from Table 2, but focuses on the long-run eﬀect
of regional tariﬀ changes, θ̂2010. As opposed to the results in Table 2, columns 1 and
2 indicate a positive and statistically signiﬁcant relationship between the log-changes in
crime rates and regional tariﬀ changes. However, once we control for state ﬁxed eﬀects
(columns 3 to 5), the coeﬃcients become negative, much smaller in magnitude than the
medium-run coeﬃcients, and not statistically signiﬁcant. As before, this changing pattern
in the long-run coeﬃcient indicates that states experiencing more negative shocks also
experienced other changes that tended to reduce crime. Once we control for common state
characteristics, there is no noticeable relationship between log-changes in crime rates and
regional tariﬀ changes over the 1991-2010 interval.
Table 3: Regional Tariﬀ Changes and Log-Changes in Local Crime Rates: 1991
2010
Dep. Var.: ∆91−10 log (CRr) OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RTCr 5.293*** 6.668** -1.324 -1.198 -1.340
(1.494) (2.899) (2.454) (2.265) (2.437)
∆80−91 log (CRr) -0.514*** 0.0681
(0.0902) (0.227)
State Fixed Eﬀects No No Yes Yes Yes
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic 52.2
Observations 411 411 411 411 411
R-squared 0.066 0.133 0.642 0.702 
Notes: DATASUS data. Standard errors (in parentheses) adjusted for 91 meso-region clusters.
Unit of analysis r is a micro-region. Columns: (1) Observations are not weighted; (2) Observa-
tions are weighted by population; (3) Adds state ﬁxed eﬀects to (2); (4) Adds pre-trends to (3);
(5) Two-Stage Least Squares, with an instrument for ∆80−91 log (CRr) (see text).
Signiﬁcant at the *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent level.
One important concern with our estimates is that the RTCr shocks may be correlated
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with pre-existing trends in the outcome of interest. For this reason, Tables 2 and 3
included pre-existing trends in log crime rates as an additional control to rule out that the
estimated eﬀects were driven by a (coincidental) correlation between pre-existing trends
and (future) regional tariﬀ changes. The results show that pre-trends have no eﬀect on our
estimates of interest, indicating that pre-existing trends are not likely to be a challenge to
our identiﬁcation strategy. Table 4 corroborates this conclusion and shows that regional
tariﬀ changes are uncorrelated with pre-trends by directly regressing pre-liberalization
changes in crime on (future) trade shocks. In all speciﬁcations, the coeﬃcients are small
in magnitude, with opposite signs to those from Table 2, and not statistically signiﬁcant.
Table 4: 1980-1991 Log-Changes in Crime Rates and
Regional Tariﬀ Changes  Placebo Tests
Dep. Var.: ∆80−91 log (CRr) (1) (2) (3)
RTCr 0.727 0.200 0.162
(1.096) (1.409) (0.893)
State Fixed Eﬀects No No Yes
Observations 411 411 411
R-squared 0.002 0.000 0.426
Notes: DATASUS data. Standard errors (in parentheses) ad-
justed for 91 meso-region clusters. Unit of analysis r is a micro-
region. Columns: (1) Observations are not weighted; (2) Obser-
vations are weighted by population; (3) Adds state ﬁxed eﬀects
to (2).
Signiﬁcant at the *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent level.
It is important to emphasize that the estimation of θt in equation (1) can only reveal
relative eﬀects of Brazil's trade liberalization on crime. This is a well-known limitation of
reduced-form estimates in the presence of important general equilibrium eﬀects, which is a
common feature of all trade and local labor markets literature. These general equilibrium
eﬀects, common to all units, will be absorbed in the intercept ξt. Therefore, we cannot
make statements about the total eﬀect of the trade reform on the national crime level
without imposing restrictive theoretical assumptions. A full structural model quantifying
absolute eﬀects of trade on crime is out of the scope of this paper and is suggested as
future work on the topic. Nevertheless, the variation we explore reveals the relationship
between local economic shocks and crime rates by comparing regions with diﬀerent degrees
of exposure to the trade shock.
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4.2 Dynamic Eﬀects
The previous section documented that the trade-induced local shocks had a strong
eﬀect on crime rates, but that the eﬀect was temporary. Regions that were hit harder
by liberalization experienced relative increases in crime rates in the medium run (1991 to
2000), but these increases vanished in the long run (1991 to 2010). Here, we conﬁrm this
pattern by plotting the yearly evolution of the eﬀect of the trade shocks on crime (θ̂t for
t = 1992, ..., 2010) in Figure 3. Given that we view liberalization approximately as a one-
time permanent shock that unfolded between 1990 and 1995, we interpret the evolution of
θ̂t as the empirical dynamic response of crime rates to the local shocks RTCr. The points
in the ﬁgure for 2000 and 2010 correspond to theRTCr coeﬃcients in columns (3) of Tables
2 and 3. The circular blue markers in Figure 3 show that harder-hit regions experienced
gradual increases in crime relative to the national average over the years immediately
following the end of trade liberalization, but these increases eventually receded. Note
that we present coeﬃcient estimates for 1992-94, but these should be interpreted with
care, as liberalization was still an ongoing process during these intermediate years.21
Figure 3 also shows a series of pre-liberalization coeﬃcients, in which the dependent
variable is the change in log crime rates between 1980 and the year listed on the x-
axis, and the independent variable is RTCr. None of these coeﬃcients is statistically
signiﬁcant, corroborating the conclusion that pre-existing trends in regional crime rates
were uncorrelated with the shocks induced by trade liberalization.
Together, the results from this section indicate that the liberalization-induced eco-
nomic shocks had a strong causal eﬀect on crime rates over the short and medium runs,
but that this eﬀect vanished in the long run. We now investigate through what channels
these local economic shocks aﬀected crime.
21However, the tariﬀ cuts were almost fully implemented by 1993, so these early coeﬃcients are still
informative regarding liberalization's short-run eﬀects. When regressing RTCr on an alternate version
measuring tariﬀ changes from 1990-93, the R2 is 0.93.
17
Figure 3: Dynamic Eﬀects of Regional Tariﬀ Changes on Log-Changes in Local Crime
Rates
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Each point reﬂects an individual regression coeﬀcient, θ̂t following (1), where the dependent variable is
the change in regional log crime rates and the independent variable is the regional tariﬀ change (RTCr).
Note that RTCr always reﬂects tariﬀ changes from 1990-1995. For blue circles, the changes are from
1991 to the year listed on the x-axis. For red triangles, the changes are from 1980 to the year listed. All
regressions include state ﬁxed eﬀects. Negative estimates imply larger crime increases in regions facing
larger tariﬀ reductions. Vertical bars indicate that liberalization began in 1991 and was complete by 1995.
Dashed lines show 95 percent conﬁdence intervals. Standard errors adjusted for 91 mesoregion clusters.
5 How Did the Trade Shocks Aﬀect Crime?
5.1 Potential Mechanisms
An established literature shows that regions exposed to increased foreign competi-
tion tend to experience deteriorations in labor market conditions (Autor et al., 2013;
Kovak, 2013; Dix-Carneiro and Kovak, 2015b). The link between labor market conditions
(employment and earnings) and crime has also been extensively explored (Raphael and
Winter-Ebmer, 2001; Gould et al., 2002; Lin, 2008; Fougère et al., 2009). Therefore, labor
market conditions constitute a natural channel through which increased foreign compe-
tition may have aﬀected crime rates. Nevertheless, local shocks leading to reductions in
labor demand can also aﬀect crime in other ways. Negative shocks to local economic ac-
tivity can reduce government revenues and, consequently, impact the provision of public
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goods, which can directly aﬀect crime rates.22 Finally, poor labor market conditions can
also aﬀect crime indirectly, through increased inequality or deteriorated mental health due
to stress or depression (Fajnzylber et al., 2002; Bourguignon et al., 2003; Card and Dahl,
2011; Fazel et al., 2015). The latter can be important in our setting because we are using
homicides to measure crime rates.
In this section, we examine how liberalization aﬀected variables belonging to these
three sets of determinants and discuss their relative importance in explaining the reduced-
form response of crime rates to the local trade shocks. Speciﬁcally, we estimate equations
similar to (1), but use variables capturing these various channels as dependent variables,
instead of crime rates. All left hand side variables are transformed using the natural
logarithm, so estimated responses can be interpreted as elasticities with respect to regional
tariﬀ changes.23
Panel A in Table 5 presents the results for the eﬀect of regional tariﬀ changes on labor
market earnings in columns 1 and 2 and on employment rates in columns 3 and 4, for the
1991-2000 and the 1991-2010 periods, respectively.24 The results show that regions facing
greater exposure to foreign competition after the liberalization episode (more negative
RTCr) experienced relative reductions in earnings in the medium run (2000), followed by
a timid recovery in the long run (2010). The point estimate of the impact on earnings is
reduced by 10 percent and loses precision between 2000 and 2010, although the coeﬃcients
are not statistically diﬀerent. In turn, the eﬀect on employment rates is temporary, being
large and signiﬁcant in 2000 but vanishing in 2010. The point estimates indicate that
a change in regional tariﬀs of -0.1 log point would lead to a 0.064 log-point reduction
in the employment rate in 2000, with the eﬀect vanishing in 2010. The stronger eﬀect
of liberalization on the labor market in 2000 when compared to 2010 mirrors the proﬁle
found in the previous section for the response of local crime to regional tariﬀ changes.
Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2015b) show that the long-run recovery in employment rates
experienced by harder-hit regions reﬂects relative increases in informal employment, while
formal employment keeps falling. They also emphasize that the eﬀects of liberalization on
local formal sector earnings is permanent and gradually magniﬁed over time. However,
overall local earnings (including formal and informal workers) partially recover in the
long run, as we corroborate with the evidence presented here (despite small diﬀerences in
speciﬁcations).25
In Panel B of Table 5, we consider other economic consequences of the local tariﬀ
22For example, there is ample evidence on the role of police presence, schooling, and welfare payments
in preventing crime (Levitt, 1997; Schargrodsky and di Tella, 2004; Jacob and Lefgren, 2003; Lochner and
Moretti, 2004; Foley, 2011).
23Remember that regional tariﬀ changes are measured in terms of log points.
24Changes in our regional employment and earnings variables are net of composition, so that changes
in these variables reﬂect changes in regional labor market conditions for observationally equivalent indi-
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Table 5: Investigation of Potential Mechanisms
Panel A: Labor Market Outcomes
Earnings Employment Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1991-2000 1991-2010 1991-2000 1991-2010
RTCr 0.527*** 0.460* 0.643*** -0.0510
(0.123) (0.243) (0.0627) (0.102)
R-squared 0.731 0.737 0.528 0.637
Panel B: Government Revenue and Tax Base
Gov. Revenue per Capita Wage Bill per Capita # Formal Establishments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1991-2000 1991-2010 1991-2000 1991-2010 1991-2000 1991-2010
RTCr 1.500* 2.330*** 4.695*** 8.963*** 2.519*** 4.319***
(0.803) (0.585) (0.482) (0.643) (0.304) (0.351)
R-squared 0.476 0.543 0.569 0.768 0.718 0.793
Panel C: Provision of Public Goods
Gov. Spending per Capita Public Safety Personnel High School Dropouts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1991-2000 1991-2010 1991-2000 1991-2010 1991-2000 1991-2010
RTCr 3.153*** 5.184*** 0.940*** 1.519*** -0.354* -2.397***
(0.665) (0.617) (0.246) (0.400) (0.200) (0.291)
R-squared 0.592 0.724 0.390 0.444 0.479 0.666
Panel D: Miscellaneous
Suicide Rates Income Inequality (Gini)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1991-2000 1991-2010 1991-2000 1991-2010
RTCr 1.551 2.148 -0.252*** -0.753***
(1.138) (2.017) (0.0740) (0.166)
R-squared 0.301 0.482 0.468 0.535
Notes: All left-hand-side variables are given by the changes of logs over the indicated period.
Public Safety Personnel and High School Dropouts are both measured per capita. Income in-
equality is measured by the Gini coeﬃcient of per capita household income. Standard errors
(in parentheses) adjusted for 91 meso-region clusters. Unit of analysis r is a micro-region. 411
micro-region observations, except for 3 to 4 missing values in government spending and revenue.
Observations are weighted by population. All speciﬁcations control for state-period ﬁxed eﬀects.
Signiﬁcant at the *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent level.
shocks. The table analyzes the impact on government revenues (per capita), number of
operating formal establishments (with positive employment), and formal wage bill (per
viduals (for details on this procedure, see Appendix C.1).
25Although results are consistent across papers, note that there are small diﬀerences in speciﬁcations
between the results shown in Table 5 and the results discussed by Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2015b) such
as how observations are weighted or the exact deﬁnition of labor earnings.
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capita). In the medium run (columns 1, 3, and 5), we observe eﬀects analogous to those
seen in the labor market: regions facing greater exposure to foreign competition experience
relative reductions in government revenue, in the number of formal establishments, and
in the formal wage bill. However, the long-run eﬀects are very diﬀerent: while overall
labor market eﬀects tend to dissipate, the impacts on these economic activity indicators
are permanent and ampliﬁed over time. For example, a change in regional tariﬀs of -
0.1 log point would lead to a reduction of 0.15 log point in government revenues in the
medium run, and 0.23 in the long run. These results are also consistent with Dix-Carneiro
and Kovak (2015b), who document that formal employment and the number of formal
establishments gradually declines in adversely aﬀected regions relative to the national
average.
These ﬁndings are relevant because they speak to the local government's ability to
provide public goods. Panel C in Table 5 investigates this point and shows that the long-
run contraction in economic activity in the formal sector was followed by a reduction in
the provision of public goods. Government spending (per capita), the number of workers
employed in jobs related to public safety (as a fraction of the population), and the share
of youth aged 14-18 out of school (high-school dropouts) experience relative deteriorations
in regions facing larger tariﬀ shocks. As in Panel B, these eﬀects increase substantially
between 2000 and 2010. For example, in response to a change in regional tariﬀs of -0.1
log point, the number of public safety personnel (per capita) is reduced by 0.094 log-point
between 1991 and 2000, and by 0.15 between 1991 and 2010. It is worth noting that
rather than thinking of these three variables as independent factors potentially determin-
ing crime, we consider them as diﬀerent manifestations of a single phenomenon taking
place during this period: the reduced capacity of the state to provide public goods due to
reduced government revenues.
The last set of variables we analyze is related to other indirect channels through
which deteriorations in labor market conditions (caused by the trade shocks) may have
aﬀected crime. Panel D in Table 5 looks at the responses of inequality (measured by
the Gini coeﬃcient for per capita household income) and suicide rates to the local trade
shocks. Regarding suicides, results are not statistically signiﬁcant and point estimates
do not indicate deteriorations in mental health as a result of adverse economic shocks (if
anything, larger exposure to the shock is associated with a lower suicide rate, although
not signiﬁcantly). However, we ﬁnd patterns for the response of inequality similar to
those documented for the economic outcomes in Panels B and C. Regions facing greater
exposure to foreign competition also experience relative increases in inequality, which are
enhanced in the long run: a -0.1 change in RTCr is associated with increases of 0.025 log
point in the Gini coeﬃcient in the medium run and 0.075 in the long run.
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Taken together, the results from Table 5 suggest that three sets of factors  labor mar-
ket conditions, public goods provision, and inequality  may have intermediated the eﬀect
of trade shocks on crime. Among these, only labor market conditions display dynamic
responses similar to those documented for crime rates. In harder-hit regions, employment
rates and earnings decline sharply in the medium run, concomitantly with the increase in
crime, and then recover  partially in the case of earnings and fully for employment rates
 as crime also recedes to the national trend. Public goods provision and inequality, quite
diﬀerently, experience deteriorations that are magniﬁed over time. Once these dynamics
are taken into account, it seems diﬃcult to rationalize the response of crime to the regional
tariﬀ shocks without resorting to the labor market as a key intervening mechanism. We
formalize this argument in the next section.
5.2 Separating Mechanisms
The previous section showed that the RTCr shocks are signiﬁcantly associated with
a host of potential mechanisms that could have intermediated the eﬀect of trade liberal-
ization on crime. Here, we propose a framework that attempts to shed light on the role
of these mechanisms in explaining the eﬀects we documented in Section 4. We argue that
(1) by assuming a stable long-run relationship between these variables and crime, (2) by
imposing theoretical sign restrictions on their eﬀects on crime, and (3) by exploiting the
distinct dynamic responses of these variables to RTCr, we can conclude that a substantial
part of the eﬀect of RTCr on crime must have been materialized through labor market
conditions, especially employment rates.
5.2.1 Empirical Framework
Informed by the literature on the socio-economic determinants of crime and in light
of the evidence from Table 5, we consider three broad categories of mechanisms through
which liberalization may have aﬀected crime: labor market conditions (earnings and em-
ployment rates), provision of public goods (government spending, public safety personnel,
and high-school dropouts), and inequality. From now on, we assume that the RTCr shock
could have aﬀected local crime rates only through these mechanisms. More precisely, we
assume that there is a stable long-run relationship between crime and these variables,
described by the following equation:
∆ log (CRr) = β
w∆ log (wr) + β
e∆ log (Pe,r) + β
g∆ log (GovSpr) (2)
+ βps∆ log (PSr) + β
h∆ log (HSDropr) + β
i∆ log (Ineqr) + ηr,
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where ∆ refers to long changes over time, w refers to labor market earnings, Pe to em-
ployment rates, GovSp to government spending, PS to public safety personnel, HSDrop
to youth (14-18) out of school, which we call high-school dropouts, and Ineq to per capita
household income inequality. We also assume that Cov(RTCr, ηr) = 0, that is, RTCr
aﬀects crime only through the variables in the right hand side of equation (2).26
We rely on equation (2) to dissect the mechanisms behind the medium- and long-run
eﬀects of RTCr on crime. First, note that we can decompose the medium- and long-
run changes in crime into a projection onto RTCr and a residual orthogonal to RTCr.27
To save on notation, let period 1 denote 1991-2000 and period 2 denote 1991-2010. By
projecting medium- and long-run changes in crime onto RTCr, we can always write:
∆1 log (CRr) = θ1RTCr + εr,1
∆2 log (CRr) = θ2RTCr + εr,2
where θ1 and θ2 are projection coeﬃcients, and Cov(RTCr, εr,1) = Cov(RTCr, εr,2) = 0
by construction.28 In fact, these are the equations that we estimated in Tables 2 and 3,
when we eﬀectively projected changes in crime onto RTCr using Ordinary Least Squares.
If the eﬀect of the local trade shocks on crime is intermediated by other variables, such
as the ones in the right hand side of equation (2), θ1 and θ2 can be seen as reduced-form
eﬀects of RTCr on changes in crime in the medium and long run.
Now consider the variables Xr ∈ {wr, Pe,r, GovSpr, PSr, HSDropr, Ineqr} on the
right hand side of equation (2). Our Ordinary Least Squares regression coeﬃcients in
Table 5 are given by the coeﬃcients bX1 and b
X
2 in the equations below:
∆1 log (Xr) = b
X
1 RTCr + u
X
r,1
∆2 log (Xr) = b
X
2 RTCr + u
X
r,2
where Cov(RTCr, uXr,1) = Cov(RTCr, u
X
r,2) = 0 by construction.
Substituting the relationship for each of the X variables of interest in equation (2)
26We can also think of this relationship as a more parsimonious speciﬁcation relating crime only to the
three broad categories mentioned before: labor market conditions, public good provision, and inequality.
From this perspective, the variables listed in equation (2) would be alternative proxies for these channels
linking economic shocks to crime.
27In general, for any two variables z and x, we can always express z as a function of x and a residual
orthogonal to x: z = αx+ u, where α = E(zx)/E(x2) and, by construction, Cov(x, u) = 0 (we omit the
constant for clarity).
28We omit the constant and other controls such as state ﬁxed eﬀects for clarity of exposition.
23
and collecting terms, one obtains:
∆t log(CRr) =
(
βwbwt + β
ebet + β
gbgt + β
psbpst + β
hbht + β
ibit
)
RTCr
+ βwuwr,t + β
euer,t + β
gugr,t + β
psupsr,t + β
huhr,t + β
iuir,t + ηr,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ωr,t
for t = 1, 2.
Given the assumption that Cov(RTCr, ηr,t) = 0 and the fact that RTCr is uncorre-
lated with the u residuals by construction, it follows that Cov(RTCr, ωr,t) = 0. By the
uniqueness of the projection of ∆t log (CRr) onto RTCr, it must also be the case that(
θ1
θ2
)
= βw
(
bw1
bw2
)
+ βe
(
be1
be2
)
+ βg
(
bg1
bg2
)
+
βps
(
bps1
bps2
)
+ βh
(
bh1
bh2
)
+ βi
(
bi1
bi2
)
. (3)
In words, if we have a stable and linear relationship between crime and its underlying
determinants, the vector θ giving the medium- and long-run reduced-form eﬀects of RTCr
on crime must be given by a linear combination of the vectors describing the reduced-form
eﬀects of RTCr on each of the determinants of crime (where the weights are given by the
parameters βj). Without additional assumptions, this observation is not of much help
and simply reﬂects that we cannot identify the β's solely based on medium- and long-run
responses to the RTCr shocks. In this case, we can estimate the θ's and the b's, but we
cannot identify the β's. However, if we are able to impose theoretical restrictions on the
β coeﬃcients from equation (2), expression (3) may be valuable in shedding light on the
relevance of some of the factors under consideration. We follow this direction in Section
5.2.2.
Equation (3) highlights the limits to identiﬁcation in our setting if we do not resort
to additional assumptions. However, it also highlights the power of exploiting distinct
dynamic eﬀects of a single shock to achieve the identiﬁcation of multiple coeﬃcients.
The general message is that with enough observations over time and distinct dynamic
responses of the right hand side variables to the shock, full identiﬁcation could in principle
be achieved. To be speciﬁc, suppose we had seven data points instead of just three (1991,
2000 and 2010). In that case, it might have been possible to achieve full identiﬁcation
with this method, provided a full rank condition was met (meaning that the dynamic
responses of the right hand side variables in equation (2) were suﬃciently heterogeneous).
We would have a six-dimensional θ vector in the left hand side and six- dimensional b
vectors in the right hand side, that is, six equations with six unknowns.
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5.2.2 Theoretical Restrictions and Bounds on the Eﬀect of Labor Market
Conditions on Crime
The classical theoretical formulation of the decision to participate in illegal activities
developed by Ehrlich (1973) predicts that better opportunities in the legal market, higher
probability of apprehension (police presence), and lower inequality reduce participation
into crime.29 An increase in the number of high school drop-outs should increase crime
due to reduced incapacitation and worsened future labor market opportunities, as formally
analyzed by Lochner (2011). Finally, increases in government spending indicate improved
provision of public goods and are likely to be associated with greater police presence and
better schools, and, consequently, to reductions in crime. All of these relationships are
supported by the available empirical evidence on the eﬀects of police (Levitt, 1997; Schar-
grodsky and di Tella, 2004), schooling (Jacob and Lefgren, 2003; Lochner and Moretti,
2004), inequality (Fajnzylber et al., 2002; Bourguignon et al., 2003), and labor market
conditions (Raphael and Winter-Ebmer, 2001; Gould et al., 2002) on crime.
Therefore, the theoretical and empirical literature suggests that βw ≤ 0 (growing
wages do not lead to increases in crime), βe ≤ 0 (growing employment does not lead to
increases in crime), βg ≤ 0 (growing government expenditures do not lead to increases
in crime), βps ≤ 0 (expanding police forces do not lead to increases in crime), βh ≥ 0
(more high school dropouts does not lead to reductions in crime), and βi ≥ 0 (growing
inequality does not lead to reductions in crime). Note that these sign restrictions are in
the form of weak inequalities, so that each of these eﬀects are allowed to be zero. Let us
assume that these restrictions are valid and, for ease of exposition, deﬁne β˜j = |βj |, with
j ∈ {w, e, g, ps, h, i}, so that we can write:
(
θ1
θ2
)
= β˜w
(
−bw1
−bw2
)
+ β˜e
(
−be1
−be2
)
+ β˜g
(
−bg1
−bg2
)
+ β˜ps
(
−bps1
−bps2
)
+ β˜h
(
bh1
bh2
)
+ β˜i
(
bi1
bi2
)
, (4)
and β˜j ≥ 0 for j ∈ {w, e, g, ps, h, i}. In words, the vector θ must be generated by a
positive linear combination of vectors
{−bw,−be,−bg,−bps, bh, bi}.
Figure 4 plots our estimated b̂
j
vectors, multiplied by the signs indicated in equation
(4). In the ﬁgure, the horizontal axis represents the medium-run eﬀect of RTCr and the
vertical axis represents the long-run eﬀect. The ﬁgure also plots the estimated reduced-
29In this model, the eﬀect of the labor market on the intensive margin of crime is more ambiguous.
Nevertheless, the evidence indicates that there is much more variation in crime at the extensive than at
the intensive margin (Blumstein and Visher, 1986).
25
form medium- and long-run eﬀects of RTCr on crime (vector θ̂).
Figure 4: Medium versus Long-Run Eﬀects of RTC on Diﬀerent Channels
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The horizontal axis represents the medium-term eﬀects and the vertical axis represents long-term eﬀects
of RTCr on each outcome estimated in Tables 2, 3 and 5. See text and equation (4) for details.
Two immediate conclusions arise from an inspection of Figure 4. First, note that
according to our theoretical restrictions, the documented dynamic responses of crime
to liberalization cannot be solely explained by the eﬀect of liberalization on earnings,
public goods provision and inequality. Mathematically, no positive linear combina-
tion of vectors
{
−b̂w,−b̂g,−b̂ps, b̂h, b̂i
}
can generate θ̂, as θ̂ does not belong to the
cone spanned by these vectors. Second, since θ̂ does belong to the cone spanned by{
−b̂e,−b̂w,−b̂g,−b̂ps, b̂h, b̂i
}
, employment rates must play a role in explaining the ef-
fects of trade shocks on crime. Therefore, according to our framework and theoretical sign
restrictions, we must have β˜e > 0 or βe < 0. It is also important to note that although our
framework and theoretical sign restrictions predict that θ ∈ {−be,−bw,−bg,−bps, bh, bi}
the empirical analysis does not make such an assumption. Consequently, the conﬁguration
shown in Figure 4 is consistent with the theoretical sign restrictions we impose.
A closer inspection of Figure 4 reveals that we can impose bounds on β˜e by expressing
θ̂ as a positive linear combination of −b̂e with the two outermost vectors in the cone
spanned by
{
−b̂w,−b̂g,−b̂ps, b̂h, b̂i
}
, −b̂w and −b̂h. The lower bound is obtained by
expressing θ̂ as a positive linear combination of −b̂e and b̂w, while the upper bound is
obtained by a positive linear combination of −b̂e and b̂h. This procedure is illustrated in
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Figure 5, which shows geometrically how we can estimate an upper bound
̂˜
β
e
U and a lower
bound
̂˜
β
e
L for β˜
e, based on the conﬁguration of vectors shown in Figure 4.
Figure 5: Obtaining Bounds for β˜e
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The horizontal axis represents the medium-term eﬀects and the vertical axis represents long-term eﬀects
of RTCr on each outcome estimated in Tables 2, 3 and 5. See text and equation (4) for details.
̂˜
β
e
L is
obtained by expressing θ̂ as a positive linear combination of −b̂w and −b̂e. ̂˜βeU is obtained expressing θ̂
as a linear combination of b̂
h
and −b̂e.
More rigorously, assuming that the conﬁguration of the population projection coef-
ﬁcients θ and b is similar to the one obtained for their empirical counterparts (pictured
in Figure 4) Appendix D shows that:
−θ1bw2 + θ2bw1
be1b
w
2 − bw1 be2︸ ︷︷ ︸
β˜eL
< β˜e <
−θ1bh2 + θ2bh1
be1b
h
2 − bh1be2︸ ︷︷ ︸
β˜eU
. (5)
It is easy to show that β˜eL solves:(
θ1
θ2
)
= β˜wL
(
−bw1
−bw2
)
+ β˜eL
(
−be1
−be2
)
,
and that β˜eU solves: (
θ1
θ2
)
= β˜hU
(
bh1
bh2
)
+ β˜eU
(
−be1
−be2
)
.
In words, these expressions conﬁrm that we can obtain a lower bound for β˜e by ﬁnding
the linear combination between −bw and −be that generates θ. Similarly, we obtain an
upper bound for β˜e by ﬁnding the linear combination between bh and −be that generates
θ. Since βe = −β˜e, equation (5) leads to:
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θ1b
w
2 − θ2bw1
be1b
w
2 − bw1 be2︸ ︷︷ ︸
βeU
> βe >
θ1b
h
2 − θ2bh1
be1b
h
2 − bh1be2︸ ︷︷ ︸
βeL
.
We estimate these lower and upper bounds for βe, the eﬀect of employment rates on
crime, using the empirical counterparts of their elements:
β̂eU =
θ̂1b̂
w
2 − θ̂2b̂w1
b̂e1b̂
w
2 − b̂w1 b̂e2
β̂eL =
θ̂1b̂
h
2 − θ̂2b̂h1
b̂e1b̂
h
2 − b̂h1 b̂e2
.
It is convenient to note that β̂eU solves:(
β̂wU
β̂eU
)
=
(
b̂w1 b̂
e
1
b̂w2 b̂
e
2
)−1(
θ̂1
θ̂2
)
, (6)
and that β̂eL solves: (
β̂hL
β̂eL
)
=
(
b̂h1 b̂
e
1
b̂h2 b̂
e
2
)−1(
θ̂1
θ̂2
)
. (7)
Appendix E shows that equation (6) is algebraically equivalent to a Two-Stage
Least Squares (2SLS) estimator relating changes in employment rates and earnings to
changes in crime rates. This 2SLS estimator is obtained stacking medium- and long-run
changes, and instruments are given by RTC × Period91−00 and RTC × Period91−10.30
Similarly, equation (7) is algebraically equivalent to an analogous 2SLS estimator relating
changes in employment rates and the share of high-school dropouts to changes in crime
rates.
The interpretation of the bounds estimators as 2SLS estimators is informative. Sup-
pose we estimate a regression relating crime rates to employment rates and earnings by
2SLS, using RTC × Period91−00 and RTC × Period91−10 as instruments and ignoring
the rest of the potential channels in equation (2). In that case, according to the sign
restrictions we imposed in Section 5.2.1, we would obtain an upward biased estimate for
βe, as this 2SLS estimator converges to βeU > β
e. On the other hand, suppose we estimate
a regression relating crime rates to employment rates and share of high-school dropouts
by 2SLS, using RTC ×Period91−00 and RTC ×Period91−10 as instruments and ignoring
the rest of the potential channels in equation (2). According to our sign restrictions, we
30Periodt−t′ is a dummy variable indicating if an observation relates to period t− t′.
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would obtain a downward biased estimate for βe, as this 2SLS estimator converges to
βeL < β
e.
Table 6 shows our estimates for the bounds on the eﬀect of employment rates on crime.
According to our baseline speciﬁcation  obtained using the vectors depicted in Figure
4  we obtain bounds between -5.6 (lower bound) and -3.3 (upper bound 1). Although
the upper bound estimate is economically signiﬁcant (we interpret magnitudes at the end
of this section), its standard error is very large so that we cannot reject that it is zero.
Once we take sampling error into account, the reduced-form estimates b̂
w
and b̂
e
are
close to collinear, so that the matrix with columns b̂
w
and b̂
e
in equation (6) is close to
singular. This leads to large standard errors for both β̂wU and β̂
e
U . Essentially, this means
that employment rates and earnings responded very similarly to the trade shocks, so that
there is little room to distinguish whether the liberalization-induced labor market eﬀects
on crime played out through earnings or employment rates.
Table 6: Bounds on The Eﬀect of Employment Rates on Crime
Panel A: Baseline Speciﬁcation
Upper Bound 1 Upper Bound 2 Lower Bound
-3.307 -4.473*** -5.595***
(3.205) (1.386) (1.925)
Panel B: Adding Demographic Controls
Upper Bound 1 Upper Bound 2 Lower Bound
-4.298** -4.309** -4.818***
(2.013) (1.870) (1.627)
Notes: As noted in the text, upper and lower bounds are algebraically equiv-
alent to 2SLS estimators. Standard errors are outcomes of 2SLS regressions
relating crime rates to employment and earnings, public safety or high-school
dropouts. All speciﬁcations stack 1991-2000 and 1991-2010 changes and con-
trol for state-period ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors are clustered at the meso-
region level.
Additional notes: Upper bound 1 combines employment with earnings; Upper
bound 2 combines employment with public safety; Lower bound combines
employment with high-school dropouts. See text for details.
Signiﬁcant at the *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent level.
In our discussion of Figure 4, we argued that employment rates must have non-zero
weight in explaining the dynamic response of crime to the trade shocks. Therefore, since
we cannot separate the eﬀect of employment rates from the eﬀect of earnings, we measure
labor market conditions (more broadly) solely with employment rates. We do so with
the understanding that the employment eﬀects we measure are likely to capture both
employment rate eﬀects as well as earnings eﬀects. If we omit ∆ log (wr) from the right
hand side of equation (2), it is easy to see in Figure 4 that we can obtain a lower bound
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for β˜e by expressing θ as a positive linear combination of −bps and −be. Since β˜e = −βe,
a lower bound for β˜e leads to an upper bound for βe. Details are found in Appendix D.
In that case, the upper bound estimator for βe is given by (upper bound 2):
β̂eU =
θ̂1b̂
ps
2 −θ̂2b̂ps1
b̂e1b̂
ps
2 −b̂ps1 b̂e2
,
so that β̂eU solves: (
β̂psU
β̂eU
)
=
(
b̂ps1 b̂
e
1
b̂ps2 b̂
e
2
)−1(
θ̂1
θ̂2
)
. (8)
With the understanding that if we exclude earnings from the right hand side of equation
(2) employment rates measure labor market conditions as a whole, we obtain bounds on
the eﬀect of labor market conditions between -5.6 and -4.5 (see Table 6).
Our baseline speciﬁcations in Tables 2, 3 and 5 only use state-period ﬁxed eﬀects as
controls. We conduct this same exercise by adding controls such as changes in the share
of young and unskilled males in the population (male individuals who are between 18 and
30 years old, and with less than eight years of education) and changes in the urbanization
rate (share of population living in urban settings). These demographic controls intend to
capture compositional changes in the population that can aﬀect crime (see, for example,
Glaeser et al., 1996 and Levitt, 1999). The θ̂ and b̂ estimates arising from these new
exercises are shown in Table F.1 in the Appendix. Figure F.1 shows that the conﬁguration
of vectors that arises from this exercise is similar to the one in Figure 4, so that our method
still applies.
Panel B of Table 6 shows the resulting bounds. We obtain bounds between -4.8 and
-4.3. Interestingly, in this case, we are able to separate the eﬀect of employment rates from
the eﬀect of earnings, as the resulting vectors b̂
e
and b̂
w
grow further apart (see Figure
F.1). In addition, the upper bound on βe is very similar if we combine employment
rates with either earnings (upper bound 1) or public safety personnel (upper bound 2)
to compute it. Nevertheless, we do not want to over emphasize this ﬁnding, and keep
measuring labor market conditions more broadly using employment rates, and omitting
earnings from equation (2).
We now use the estimates of our benchmark speciﬁcation in Panel A of Table 6 to
interpret the magnitude of the estimated eﬀect of labor market conditions (measured
by employment rates) on crime. For example, if log (Pe) is reduced by 0.07 log point
(the standard deviation of ∆91−00 log (Pe) across regions), the crime rate is expected to
increase between −4.5 × −0.07 = 0.32 and −5.6 × −0.07 = 0.39 log point (37 and 48
percent). Alternatively, consider a region facing a RTCr shock of -0.1 log point, which
is the 90-10 gap in the distribution of RTCr. According to Table 5, this would lead to a
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reduction in the employment rate of 0.064 log-point in the medium run, relative to the
national average. In turn, Table 6 indicates that this would be associated with a relative
increase between −4.5 × −0.064 = 0.29 and −5.6 × −0.064 = 0.36 log point (33 to 43
percent) in crime rates ﬁve years following the end of liberalization. Consequently, labor
market conditions account for 75 to 93 percent of the medium-run eﬀect of the trade-
induced economic shocks on crime and constitute the main mechanism through which the
tariﬀ-induced shocks aﬀected crime.31
6 Relationship with the Literature on Labor Market Condi-
tions and Crime
As we mentioned throughout the paper, there is a large literature measuring the eﬀect
of local unemployment rates on crime. This literature typically estimates this eﬀect by
exploiting local labor demand shifters measured with Bartik shocks as instruments for
labor market conditions. However, this literature has abstracted from other potential
mechanisms through which local labor demand shocks may aﬀect crime  for example,
through changes in government spending, police forces or inequality. It is therefore natural
to ask: if we had assumed employment rates to be the sole mechanism through which
trade shocks aﬀected crime rates and applied a 2SLS estimator using the RTC shocks
as instruments, mimicking the path this literature has followed, how would this estimate
compare with the bounds we obtained in Table 6?
We perform this exercise adding one innovation. Given that the RTCr shocks had
distinct dynamic eﬀects on many variables of interest, we can construct two instrumen-
tal variables and confront employment rates against each of the remaining channels in
equation (2), one by one. In other words, we can estimate regressions such as:
∆ log (CRr) = β
e∆ log (Pe,r) + β
X∆ log (Xr) + η
X
r (9)
where X ∈ {w,GovSp, PS,HSDrop, Ineq}. For improved eﬃciency, we stack 1991-2000
and 2000-2010 changes instead of 1991-2000 and 1991-2010 changes, otherwise the ηXr
error terms would be automatically correlated across time as the latter periods overlap.
Since we cluster standard errors at the meso-region level, our standard errors are robust to
the correlation of errors across neighboring regions and over time. We employ 2SLS and
31The total reduced-form eﬀect of a RTCr shock of -0.1 log point is to increase crime rates by
−3.85 × −0.1 = 0.385 log point. Labor market conditions account for a fraction between βeU×be1×−0.1
θ1×−0.1 =
−4.5×0.64×−0.1
−3.85×−0.1 = 0.75 and
βeL×be1×−0.1
θ1×−0.1 =
−5.6×0.64×−0.1
−3.85×−0.1 = 0.93 of this eﬀect. Remember that
θ1 = β
ebe1 + β
gbg1 + β
psbps1 + β
hbh1 + β
ibi1 (see equation (3)) and that we are measuring labor market
conditions with employment rates only.
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RTCr × I(period = 1991 − 2000) and RTCr × I(period = 2000 − 2010) as instruments.
All speciﬁcations control for state-period ﬁxed eﬀects. Results are shown in Tables 7 and
8.
Table 7: Employment Rates Against Alternative Mechanisms
Dep. Var.: ∆ log(CRr) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ log (Pe,r) -4.501*** -2.995 -4.428*** -4.329*** -5.562*** -5.063***
(1.348) (3.371) (1.319) (1.374) (1.928) (1.523)
∆ log (wr) -3.6242
(5.764)
∆ log (Gov. Spendingr) -0.3165
(0.421)
∆ log (Public Safetyr) -1.120
(1.393)
∆ log (HS Dropoutr) 0.730
(0.887)
∆ log (Inequalityr) 2.304
(3.253)
Observations 822 822 816 822 822 822
K-P rk LM statistic 21.72 4.441 17.54 7.570 15.19 16.44
p-value 0.000 0.035 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000
K-P rk Wald F statistic 53.75 1.945 29.82 6.957 32.54 13.16
A-R Wald test F-stat 8.403 8.403 8.427 8.403 8.403 8.403
A-R Wald test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Decennial Census data. Standard errors (in parentheses) adjusted for 91 meso-region
clusters. Unit of analysis r is a micro-region. Observations are weighted by population. All
speciﬁcations stack 1991-2000 and 2000-2010 changes, control for state-period ﬁxed eﬀects and
use RTCr × I(period=91-00) and RTCr × I(period=00-10) as instruments for the alternative
mechanisms. Estimation method is Two-Stage Least Squares. There are 6 missing values for
government spending in column (3).
Signiﬁcant at the *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent level.
Column 1 in Table 7 shows the 2SLS estimate of the eﬀect of employment rates on
crime if we use RTCr× I(period = 1991− 2000) and RTCr× I(period = 2000− 2010) as
instruments. This speciﬁcation is similar to what the previous literature on the topic has
adopted, except for the choice of speciﬁc instruments. In this case, we obtain an estimate
of -4.5. Therefore, in the context of our study, we obtain an estimate that is similar to the
upper bound for the eﬀect of labor market conditions on crime. However, it goes without
saying that this provides no information on the size of the bias in other studies.
Columns 2 to 6 in Table 7 sequentially confront employment rates against competing
mechanisms. Although this constitutes a step beyond what the literature on labor markets
and crime has typically considered, these regressions must still be interpreted with caution.
When we confront employment rates with public safety personnel, for example, we do not
impose sign restrictions on βe and βps as we did in Section 5.2.2, but we cannot strictly
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Table 8: Employment Rates Against Alternative Mechanisms: Adding Controls
Dep. Var.: ∆ log(CRr) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ log (Pe,r) -4.482*** -4.896** -4.591*** -4.668*** -4.202*** -4.360***
(1.266) (2.226) (1.445) (1.620) (1.544) (1.259)
∆ log (wr) 0.9391
(3.786)
∆ log (Gov. Spendingr) 0.1229
(0.523)
∆ log (Public Safetyr) 0.5274
(2.328)
∆ log (HS Dropoutr) -0.223
(0.971)
∆ log (Inequalityr) -0.600
(2.488)
∆ log (Share YUMr) -0.274 -0.236 -0.375 -0.455 -0.288 -0.238
(0.415) (0.421) (0.642) (0.954) (0.435) (0.408)
∆ log (Share Urbanr) -1.119*** -1.182*** -1.219*** -1.227*** -1.188*** -1.182***
(0.397) (0.309) (0.350) (0.392) (0.310) (0.303)
Observations 822 822 816 822 822 822
K-P rk LM statistic 22.43 5.872 15.03 3.607 12.52 16.29
p-value 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.057 0.000 0.000
K-P rk Wald F statistic 65.89 3.185 22.82 2.785 36.71 18.89
A-R Wald test F-stat 8.473 8.473 8.512 8.473 8.473 8.473
A-R Wald test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Decennial Census data. Standard errors (in parentheses) adjusted for 91 meso-region clus-
ters. Unit of analysis r is a micro-region. Observations are weighted by population. All spec-
iﬁcations stack 1991-2000 and 2000-2010 changes, control for state-period ﬁxed eﬀects and use
RTCr × I(period=91-00) and RTCr × I(period=00-10) as instruments for the alternative mech-
anisms. Estimation method is Two-Stage Least Squares. There are 6 missing values for government
spending in column (3). YUM stands for Young, Unskilled and Male.
Signiﬁcant at the *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent level.
rule out that a combination of the remaining variables in equation (2) is an important
determinant of crime, therefore biasing our estimates. Nonetheless, the stability of the βe
estimates in the sequential estimation of (9) for each competing mechanism gives us more
conﬁdence that, indeed, labor market conditions constituted an important mechanism
through which the trade shocks aﬀected crime. The only instance where the estimate of
βe is non-signiﬁcant is when we confront employment rates with earnings. In that case,
as we discussed, we cannot separate the eﬀect of employment rates from the eﬀect of
earnings, as they are aﬀected by the RTCr shocks in very similar ways over the medium
and long runs. Table 8 reproduces the same exercises in Table 7, but also controls for
changes in demographic variables. We obtain very similar estimates.
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7 Discussion
This paper exploits the local economic shocks induced by the Brazilian trade liberaliza-
tion episode to provide credible estimates of the eﬀect of economic conditions on criminal
activity. We take advantage of two key features of Brazil's liberalization to make progress
in understanding the mechanisms behind this eﬀect: (i) the discreteness and persistence
of the shock; and (ii) its heterogeneous dynamic eﬀects on the potential mechanisms be-
hind the response of crime rates. We provide a framework that exploits these elements to
argue that it is diﬃcult to rationalize the observed response of crime to the trade shocks
without attributing a key role to labor market variables, in particular to the employment
rate.
By linking trade-induced shocks to crime, this paper contributes to a growing literature
on the eﬀects of trade beyond the labor market and documents a new dimension of adjust-
ment costs that may follow trade shocks. Analyses of these adjustment costs have typically
focused on frictions impeding or slowing the reallocation of resources needed to generate
production gains from trade (Artuç et al., 2010; Co³ar, 2013; Dix-Carneiro, 2014) or on
workers whose labor market trajectories are adversely aﬀected by trade (Menezes-Filho
and Muendler, 2011; Autor et al., 2014; Dix-Carneiro and Kovak, 2015b; Utar, 2015).
Since crime generates substantial externalities, our results add a relevant dimension to
these adjustment costs by showing that the consequences of trade shocks go beyond the
individuals directly aﬀected by them.
It is worthwhile to stress one important aspect of our approach. Most of the literature
on labor markets and crime resorts to some sort of regional economic shocks  such
as Bartik shocks  as a source of exogenous variation. The evidence from Section 5
indicates that local economic shocks aﬀecting the labor market are likely to be correlated
with other dimensions that may also be relevant determinants of crime rates (such as
public goods provision and inequality). This suggests that the instruments used in the
previous literature do not satisfy the exclusion restriction required by an IV estimator.
This is precisely why we explore the distinct dynamic responses of the various potential
mechanisms in order to be able to provide bounds for the causal eﬀect of labor market
conditions on crime. In the context of our study, the traditional IV estimates of the eﬀect
of labor market conditions on crime is very similar to what our methodology delivered as
an upper bound (lower bound for the magnitude of the eﬀect).
We documented that regions facing greater exposure to foreign competition experi-
enced gradual increases in crime relative to the national average over the years immediately
following the trade liberalization, but that these increases in crime eventually receded.
Our analysis presents evidence that the recovery of the labor market in these harder-hit
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regions played a key role in reducing crime in the long run. Interestingly, Dix-Carneiro
and Kovak (2015b) show that the long-run recovery in employment rates was entirely due
to an expansion of the informal sector. In this context, informal employment seems to
have been enough to keep individuals away from crime. Enforcement of labor regulations
that tend to reduce informality but increase unemployment could therefore exacerbate the
response of crime to economic downturns. Analogously, the evidence we provide also high-
lights the importance of counter-cyclical policies, by improving labor market prospects,
as instruments to ﬁght crime. The costs of economic downturns  or of low employability
in general  go beyond those faced by the individuals who directly suﬀer from worsened
labor market opportunities. In such circumstances, there is a potential welfare enhancing
role for government interventions that are successful in improving labor market outcomes.
Finally, we focus on a developing country with high levels of violence and document an
economically large response of homicide rates to local labor market conditions. There are a
few possible explanations for the large response of homicide rates that we estimate, which
contrast to largely zero eﬀects on violent crime found in the previous literature (which
focused exclusively in developed countries with low crime rates). Our natural experiment
and empirical framework combined lead to a more transparent identiﬁcation of the eﬀect
of labor market conditions on crime than the empirical strategies that have been used
so far. In addition, we explore the context of a developing country with high incidence
of crime and poor labor market conditions, in sharp contrast to the developed country
context that has been the focus of previous research. The ﬁrst of these factors probably
allows us to more precisely estimate the response of crime to labor market outcomes, while
the second provides a setting where the response of crime is likely to be stronger. The
evidence suggests that the criminogenic eﬀect of deteriorations in labor market conditions
is indeed more extreme and policy relevant in developing countries with poor labor market
conditions and high levels of violence.
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Web Appendix  Not for Publication
A Homicide Rates as a Proxy for Overall Criminal Activity
This section investigates to what extent local homicide rates constitute a good proxy
for overall criminal activity. We examine data from Minas Gerais and São Paulo, the two
most populous states in Brazil, which account for 32 percent of Brazil's total population.
These constitute the very few Brazilian states publishing disaggregate crime data from
police-compiled statistics since the early 2000s at the municipality level. We have data for
four types of crime: homicides recorded by the health system (our dependent variable),
homicides recorded by the police, violent crimes against the person (excluding homicides),
and violent property crimes. Violent property crimes refer to robberies in both states.
Violent crimes against the person refer to rape in São Paulo and to rape, assaults, and
attempted homicides in Minas Gerais. The data are provided by the statistical agencies
of the two states (Fundação SEADE for São Paulo and Fundação João Pinheiro for Minas
Gerais).
We start by examining how the rates of diﬀerent types of crime recorded by the police
correlate with the homicide rates used in our empirical analysis for a 5-year interval.
As Table A.1 shows, our measure of homicides is highly correlated, both in levels and
in changes, to police-recorded homicides, to property crimes, and to crimes against the
person.
Table A.2 shows the results in log-levels for both São Paulo and Minas Gerais using
yearly data and 10-year intervals. Table A.3 shows correlations for log-changes for both
states and the same time intervals. Homicide rates measured by the police and the health
system are highly correlated, with a strongly signiﬁcant correlation that ranges from 0.84
to 0.92. Both measures of homicides are also strongly and signiﬁcantly correlated with
crimes against the person and property crimes, but particularly so with the latter. It is
worth noting that the correlations in Panel B of Table A.3 should be interpreted with
caution given the small number of observations used to generate them.
Tables A.4 and A.5 relate our measure of homicide rates (from the health system) to
the rates of crimes against the person, property crimes and homicides measured by the
police. These regressions control for micro-region and year ﬁxed eﬀects, so we focus on
how changes in our measure of criminal activity, relative to aggregate crime trends, relate
to changes in other measures of crime within regions. The ﬁrst three columns show results
in line with those from Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3. Even after we account for micro-region
ﬁxed eﬀects and common trends in crime, homicide rates measured by the health system
are strongly correlated with homicides recorded by the police, crimes against the person,
and property crimes. Moreover, these correlations are stronger when we restrict attention
to longer time windows. Columns 4 and 5 progressively include the diﬀerent measures of
crime rates on the right hand side.
In sum, Table A.1 and the results presented in this section indicate that local homicide
rates measured by the health system (DATASUS) are indeed systematically correlated
with local overall crime rates recorded by the police.
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Table A.1: Correlation Between Homicide Rates And Other Crime Measures: Micro-
Regions of São Paulo and Minas Gerais, 5-year intervals (2001, 2006 and 2011)
Log-Levels
log(CRr) log(HomPolr) log(Personr) log(Propertyr)
São Paulo
log(CRr) 1
log(HomPolr) 0.849
∗∗∗ 1
log(Personr) 0.204
∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗ 1
log(Propertyr) 0.611
∗∗∗ 0.490∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗ 1
Observations 186
Minas Gerais
log(CRr) 1
log(HomPolr) 0.889
∗∗∗ 1
log(Personr) 0.580
∗∗∗ 0.711∗∗∗ 1
log(Propertyr) 0.716
∗∗∗ 0.644∗∗∗ 0.633∗∗∗ 1
Observations 192
Log-Changes
∆5 log(CRr) ∆5 log(HomPolr) ∆5 log(Personr) ∆5 log(Propertyr)
São Paulo
∆5 log(CRr) 1
∆5 log(HomPolr) 0.700
∗∗∗ 1
∆5 log(Personr) 0.513
∗∗∗ 0.483∗∗∗ 1
∆5 log(Propertyr) 0.348
∗∗∗ 0.415∗∗∗ 0.455∗∗∗ 1
Observations 124
Minas Gerais
∆5 log(CRr) 1
∆5 log(HomPolr) 0.675
∗∗∗ 1
∆5 log(Personr) 0.435
∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗ 1
∆5 log(Propertyr) 0.393
∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗ 0.783∗∗∗ 1
Observations 128
Notes: Data are provided by the statistical agencies of the two states (Fundação SEADE for São
Paulo and Fundação João Pinheiro for Minas Gerais. Observations are weighted by region-speciﬁc
population. CRr is the homicide rate measured by the health system (DATASUS), HomPolr is the
homicide rate measured by the police, Personr is the rate of crimes against the person, and Propertyr
is the rate of property crimes. Notation: ∆sy = yt+s − yt..
Signiﬁcant at the *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, and * 10 percent level.
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Table A.2: Correlation Between Homicide Rates And Other Crime Mea-
sures: Micro-Regions of São Paulo and Minas Gerais, 20002010
Panel A: Yearly data
log(CRr) log(HomPolr) log(Personr) log(Propertyr)
São Paulo
log(CRr) 1
log(HomPolr) 0.884
∗∗∗ 1
log(Personr) 0.371
∗∗∗ 0.376∗∗∗ 1
log(Propertyr) 0.633
∗∗∗ 0.542∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗ 1
Observations 682
Minas Gerais
log(CRr) 1
log(HomPolr) 0.916
∗∗∗ 1
log(Personr) 0.658
∗∗∗ 0.740∗∗∗ 1
log(Propertyr) 0.733
∗∗∗ 0.652∗∗∗ 0.613∗∗∗ 1
Observations 704
Panel B: 10-year intervals (2001 and 2011)
São Paulo
log(CRr) 1
log(HomPolr) 0.844
∗∗∗ 1
log(Personr) 0.0793 0.0138 1
log(Propertyr) 0.614
∗∗∗ 0.460∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗ 1
Observations 124
Minas Gerais
log(CRr) 1
log(HomPolr) 0.859
∗∗∗ 1
log(Personr) 0.518
∗∗∗ 0.687∗∗∗ 1
log(Propertyr) 0.723
∗∗∗ 0.645∗∗∗ 0.623∗∗∗ 1
Observations 128
Notes: Data are provided by the statistical agencies of the two states (Fundação
SEADE for São Paulo and Fundação João Pinheiro for Minas Gerais). Observations
are weighted by region-speciﬁc population. CRr is the homicide rate measured by
the health system (DATASUS), HomPolr is the homicide rate measured by the
police, Personr is the rate of crimes against the person, and Propertyr is the rate
of property crimes.
Signiﬁcant at the *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, and * 10 percent level.
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Table A.3: Correlation Between Log-Changes in Homicide Rates and Other Crime Mea-
sures: Micro-Regions of São Paulo and Minas Gerais, 20002010
Panel A: Yearly data
∆1 log(CRr) ∆1 log(HomPolr) ∆1 log(Personr) ∆1 log(Propertyr)
São Paulo
∆1 log(CRr) 1
∆1 log(HomPolr) 0.586
∗∗∗ 1
∆1 log(Personr) 0.257
∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗ 1
∆1 log(Propertyr) 0.147
∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 1
Observations 620
Minas Gerais
∆1 log(CRr) 1
∆1 log(HomPolr) 0.621
∗∗∗ 1
∆1 log(Personr) 0.163
∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 1
∆1 log(Propertyr) 0.229
∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗ 1
Observations 640
Panel B: 10-year intervals (2001 and 2011)
∆10 log(CRr) ∆10 log(HomPolr) ∆10 log(Personr) ∆10 log(Propertyr)
São Paulo
∆10 log(CRr) 1
∆10 log(HomPolr) 0.755
∗∗∗ 1
∆10 log(Personr) 0.569
∗∗∗ 0.0595 1
∆10 log(Propertyr) 0.478
∗∗∗ 0.382∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗ 1
Observations 62
Minas Gerais
∆10 log(CRr) 1
∆10 log(HomPolr) 0.478
∗∗∗ 1
∆10 log(Personr) 0.259
∗∗ 0.196 1
∆10 log(Propertyr) 0.308
∗∗ 0.115 0.154 1
Observations 64
Notes: Data are provided by the statistical agencies of the two states (Fundação SEADE for São Paulo
and Fundação João Pinheiro for Minas Gerais). Observations are weighted by region-speciﬁc population.
CRr is the homicide rate measured by the health system (DATASUS); HomPolr is the homicide rate
measured by the police; Personr is the rate of crimes against the person; and Propertyr is the rate of
property crimes. Notation: ∆sy = yt+s − yt.
Signiﬁcant at the *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, and * 10 percent level.
43
Table A.4: Conditional Correlations between Homicide Rates and
Other Crime Rates: Micro-Regions of São Paulo, 20002010
Panel A: Yearly Data
Dep. Var.: log (CRr) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(Personr) 0.313
∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗
(0.0444) (0.0498) (0.0532)
log(Propertyr) 0.613
∗∗∗ 0.565∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗
(0.149) (0.147) (0.0620)
log(HomPolr) 0.482
∗∗∗ 0.448∗∗∗
(0.0444) (0.0341)
Observations 682 682 682 682 682
R2 Within 0.743 0.746 0.845 0.772 0.875
R2 Between 0.474 0.681 0.830 0.758 0.902
Panel B: 5-year intervals (2000, 2005 and 2010)
Dep. Var.: log (CRr) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(Personr) 0.451
∗∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗ 0.391∗∗∗
(0.0712) (0.0799) (0.0543)
log(Propertyr) 0.638
∗∗∗ 0.467∗∗∗ 0.0877
(0.192) (0.170) (0.0995)
log(HomPolr) 0.456
∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗
(0.0561) (0.0403)
Observations 186 186 186 186 186
R2 Within 0.762 0.728 0.845 0.779 0.898
R2 Between 0.458 0.657 0.799 0.736 0.855
Panel C: 10-year intervals (2000 and 2010)
Dep. Var.: log (CRr) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(Personr) 0.552
∗∗∗ 0.455∗∗∗ 0.490∗∗∗
(0.116) (0.133) (0.0491)
log(Propertyr) 1.023
∗∗∗ 0.732∗∗∗ 0.131
(0.288) (0.267) (0.115)
log(HomPolr) 0.466
∗∗∗ 0.431∗∗∗
(0.0615) (0.0357)
Observations 124 124 124 124 124
R2 Within 0.820 0.795 0.887 0.849 0.960
R2 Between 0.316 0.684 0.721 0.710 0.782
Notes: Data from Fundação SEADE. 62 micro-regions in the State of São
Paulo. Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the micro-region
level). All regressions control for micro-regions and year ﬁxed eﬀects. CRr is
the homicide rate measured by the health system (DATASUS), HomPolr is
the homicide rate measured by the police, Personr is the rate of violent crimes
against the person, and Propertyr is the rate of property crimes. Violent
property crimes refer to robberies, violent crimes against the person refer to
rape.
Signiﬁcant at *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, and * 10 percent.
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Table A.5: Conditional Correlations between Homicide Rates and
Other Crime Rates: Micro-Regions of Minas Gerais, 20002010
Panel A: Yearly Data
Dep. Var.: log (CRr) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(Personr) 0.280
∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗ 0.0588
(0.0710) (0.0652) (0.0479)
log(Propertyr) 0.305
∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗
(0.0983) (0.0891) (0.0628)
log(HomPolr) 0.751
∗∗∗ 0.706∗∗∗
(0.0527) (0.0450)
Observations 703 704 704 703 703
R2 Within 0.286 0.306 0.537 0.325 0.566
R2 Between 0.625 0.200 0.792 0.402 0.857
Panel B: 5-year intervals (2000, 2005 and 2010)
Dep. Var.: log (CRr) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(Personr) 0.320
∗∗ 0.260∗ 0.157
(0.133) (0.138) (0.117)
log(Propertyr) 0.252
∗∗ 0.179∗ 0.205∗∗∗
(0.103) (0.101) (0.0736)
log(HomPolr) 0.713
∗∗∗ 0.693∗∗∗
(0.0863) (0.0765)
Observations 192 192 192 192 192
R2 Within 0.544 0.537 0.667 0.553 0.692
R2 Between 0.486 0.194 0.656 0.498 0.726
Panel C: 10-year intervals (2000 and 2010)
Dep. Var.: log (CRr) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(Personr) 0.335
∗ 0.278 0.178
(0.191) (0.176) (0.162)
log(Propertyr) 0.392
∗∗ 0.348∗ 0.304∗∗
(0.184) (0.174) (0.139)
log(HomPolr) 0.638
∗∗∗ 0.567∗∗∗
(0.156) (0.152)
Observations 128 128 128 128 128
R2 Within 0.634 0.646 0.696 0.663 0.729
R2 Between 0.428 0.247 0.535 0.446 0.673
Notes: Data from Fundação João Pinheiro. 64 micro-regions in the State
of Minas Gerais. Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the
micro-region level). All regressions control for micro-regions and year ﬁxed
eﬀects. CRr is the homicide rate measured by the health system (DATASUS),
HomPolr is the homicide rate measured by the police, Personr is the rate of
violent crimes against the person, and Propertyr is the rate of property crimes.
Property crimes refer to robberies, crimes against the person refer to rape,
assaults, and attempted homicides.
Signiﬁcant at *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, and * 10 percent.
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B Tariﬀ Changes after 1995
This paper treats the 1990-1995 changes in tariﬀs induced by the trade liberalization
as a once-and-for-all shock. Indeed, changes in tariﬀs after 1995 are trivial relative to the
changes that occurred between 1990 and 1995. This section provides evidence supporting
this claim.
The data on tariﬀs used in the paper are from Kume et al. (2003). These data have
been extensively used by previous papers in the literature on trade and labor markets in
Brazil.32 However, these data only cover the period 1987-1998. In order to show how post-
liberalization tariﬀ changes relate to changes induced by the trade reform, we use data from
UNCTAD TRAINS, which cover the entire period from 1990 to 2010. Equipped with these
data, we compute regional tariﬀ changes using sectoral tariﬀ changes between 1990 and
1995 (RTCr,90−95), 1990 and 2000 (RTCr,90−00) and 1990 and 2010 (RTCr,90−10). Table
B.1 shows that regional tariﬀ changes over longer horizons, RTCr,90−00 and RTCr,90−10,
are almost perfectly correlated with RTCr,90−95 (elasticities are all larger than 0.8 and
R-squared's are all larger than 0.92). This implies that changes in tariﬀs between 1990
and 1995 can indeed be considered as permanent without substantially aﬀecting any of
our qualitative or quantitative results.
Table B.1: Regional Tariﬀ Changes 1990-1995 vs. Regional Tariﬀ
Changes 1990-2000 and 1990-2010
Dep. Var.: RTCr,90−00 RTCr,90−00 RTCr,90−10 RTCr,90−10
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RTCr,90−95 0.970*** 0.985*** 0.844*** 0.802***
(0.00359) (0.00311) (0.0113) (0.0114)
Observations Weighted
By Population No Yes No Yes
Observations 411 411 411 411
R-squared 0.994 0.996 0.931 0.923
Notes: Regional Tariﬀ Changes (RTCr) over diﬀerent horizons computed from
UNCTAD TRAINS data. RTCr,90−95 uses changes in sectoral tariﬀs between 1990
and 1995; RTCr,90−00 uses changes in sectoral tariﬀs between 1990 and 2000; and
RTCr,90−10 uses changes in sectoral tariﬀs between 1990 and 2010. UNCTAD
TRAINS tariﬀs at the product level were aggregated into 44 industries compati-
ble with the 1991 Brazilian Demographic Census. Aggregation was performed using
simple averages. These industry-level tariﬀs were then used in the calculation of
RTCr. Standard errors in parentheses.
Signiﬁcant at the *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, and * 10 percent level.
32See Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2011), Kovak (2013), Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2015a), Dix-
Carneiro and Kovak (2015b) and Hirata and Soares (2015).
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C Data Procedures
C.1 Regional Employment and Earnings Net of Compositional Eﬀects
Changes in our regional employment and earnings variables are net of composition,
so that changes in these variables reﬂect changes in regional labor market conditions for
observationally equivalent individuals and do not reﬂect changes in composition. This
section describes how we use individual-level Census data to compute region-speciﬁc log
earnings and employment rates netting out compositional eﬀects.
We obtain region- and year-speciﬁc log-earnings by estimating the Mincer regression
below and saving the ω̂rs estimates:
log (wirs) = ωrs +
∑
k
ηwksI (Educi = k) + γ
w
s I (Femalei = 1) +
δw1s (ageis − 18) + δw2s (ageis − 18)2 + εwirs, (10)
where wirs represents total monthly labor market earnings for worker i in region r in year s,
I (Educi = k) is a dummy variable corresponding to years of schooling k, I (Femalei = 1)
is a dummy for gender, ageis indicates age, and ωrs captures the average of the log of
monthly earnings net of composition in region r and time period s. Finally, εwirs is an
error term. We use ω̂rs as our measure of log-earnings in region r in year s.
Region- and year-speciﬁc employment rates are obtained in a similar fashion, by esti-
mating the linear probability model below and saving the pirs estimates:
Empirs = pirs +
∑
k
ηeksI (Educi = k) + γ
e
sI (Femalei = 1) +
δe1s (ageis − 18) + δe2s (ageis − 18)2 + εeirs, (11)
where Empirs indicates if individual i in region r was employed in year s, pirs captures
the average probability of employment net of composition in region r and time period s,
and εeirs is an error term. We use pirs as our measure of the employment rate in region r
in year s.
C.2 Employment Rates
The question in the Census questionnaire regarding work status changed between 1991
and 2000, remaining the same in 2010. In 1991 the question was "Have you worked in all or
part of the past 12 months?", while in 2000 and 2010 the question related to the surveys'
reference week. There is no widely used procedure to make these questions comparable,
so we adopt the following strategy to construct a comparable variable across Censuses'
waves.
In 1991 we deﬁne Empirt = 1 if the individual answers yes to "Have you worked
in all or part of the previous 12 months?" and zero otherwise. For 2000 and 2010, we
deﬁne Empirt = 1 if: (a) the individual worked for pay in the reference week; or (b) the
individual had a job during the reference week, but for some reason did not work that
week; or (c) the individual helped (without pay) a household member in her job or was
an intern or apprentice; or (d) the individual helped (without pay) a household member
engaged in agricultural activities; or (e) the individual worked in agricultural activities to
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supply food to household members; and Empirt = 0 otherwise. The answer "yes" to the
1991 question embeds all of the cases above.
D Derivation of Bounds for βe
Throughout this section, we will use the notation Cone(v1,v2, ...,vn) to denote the cone
spanned by vectors v1, v2, ... , vn, which consists of all positive linear combinations of
these vectors. In section 5.2.1, we obtained equation (4), which we reproduce below:
(
θ1
θ2
)
= β˜w
( −bw1
−bw2
)
+ β˜e
( −be1
−be2
)
+ β˜g
( −bg1
−bg2
)
+ β˜ps
( −bps1
−bps2
)
+ β˜h
(
bh1
bh2
)
+ β˜i
(
bi1
bi2
)
,
with β˜ ≥ 0, which means that θ belongs to the cone spanned by vectors −bw,−be,−bg,
−bps,bh and bi  which we denote Cone (−bw,−be,−bg,−bps,bh,bi). This is a theo-
retical relationship on the true population parameters, but note that empirically:
θ̂ ∈ Cone
(
−b̂w,−b̂e,−b̂g,−b̂ps, b̂h, b̂i
)
= Cone
(
−b̂e, b̂h
)
,
where the last equality follows from{
−b̂w,−b̂g,−b̂ps, b̂i
}
∈ Cone
(
−b̂e, b̂h
)
.
However, θ̂ /∈ Cone
(
−b̂w, b̂h
)
and Cone
(
−b̂w, b̂h
)
is the largest cone spanned by{
−b̂w,−b̂g,−b̂ps, b̂h, b̂i
}
.
Also note from Figure 4 that any element y ∈ Cone
(
−b̂w, b̂h
)
has y < 0. These rela-
tionships are based on estimates.
Based on these empirical results, we make the assumptions below, regarding popula-
tion projection coeﬃcients. These just reﬂect that we assume that the conﬁguration of
population vectors is similar to the conﬁguration of estimated vectors.
Assumption 1 θ ∈ Cone (−bw,−be,−bg,−bps,bh,bi)
Assumption 2 Cone
(−bw,−be,−bg,−bps,bh,bi) = Cone (−be,bh), that is, Cone (−be,bh)
is the largest cone spanned by
{−bw,−be,−bg,−bps,bh,bi}
Assumption 3 θ /∈ Cone (−bw,bh) and Cone (−bw,bh) is the largest cone spanned by{−bw,−bg,−bps,bh,bi}
Assumption 4 −bw,bh < 0
Assumption 1 guarantees that a solution to equation (4) with β˜ ≥ 0 exists. Together
with Assumptions 2 and 3, it also guarantees that β˜e > 0. Given Assumptions 1, 2 and
3, Assumption 4 is not strictily necessary for us to be able to ﬁnd bounds for β˜e, but it is
satisﬁed by the empirical counterparts and facilitates our derivation.
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Deﬁne y as:
(
y1
y2
)
= β˜w
( −bw1
−bw2
)
+ β˜g
( −bg1
−bg2
)
+ β˜ps
( −bps1
−bps2
)
+ β˜h
(
bh1
bh2
)
+ β˜i
(
bi1
bi2
)
,
So that (
θ1
θ2
)
= β˜e
( −be1
−be2
)
+
(
y1
y2
)
and y ∈ Cone (−bw,bh). Rewriting:(
θ1 − y1
θ2 − y2
)
= β˜e
( −be1
−be2
)
⇒
{
−β˜ebe1 = θ1 − y1
−β˜ebe2 = θ2 − y2
⇒ β˜e = θ2 − y2−be2
=
θ1 − y1
−be1
⇒ y2 = −b
e
2
be1
(θ1 − y1) + θ2
It is easy to see graphically on Figure 4 that, y ∈ Cone (−bw,bh) and − bw,bh < 0
leads to b
w
2
bw1
< y2y1 <
bh2
bh1
and y2, y1 < 0. Using
bw2
bw1
< y2y1 <
bh2
bh1
and y1 < 0 we get:
bw2
bw1
y1 > −b
e
2
be1
(θ1 − y1) + θ2 > b
h
2
bh1
y1
⇒
(
bw2
bw1
− b
e
2
be1
)
y1 > −b
e
2
be1
θ1 + θ2 >
(
bh2
bh1
− b
e
2
be1
)
y1
Assume that
(
bw2
bw1
− be2be1
)
> 0 and
(
bh2
bh1
− be2be1
)
> 0  this is met by the empirical counterparts.
We obtain:
− be2be1 θ1 + θ2(
bh2
bh1
− be2be1
) > y1 > − b
e
2
be1
θ1 + θ2(
bw2
bw1
− be2be1
)
Remember that βe = θ1−y1be1 and assume that b
e
1 > 0  this is also met by the empirical
counterparts. We obtain:
θ1b
h
2 − θ2bh1
be1b
h
2 − bh1be2
< βe <
θ1b
w
2 − θ2bw1
be1b
w
2 − bw1 be2
These bounds can be estimated with:
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β̂eL =
θ̂1b̂
h
2 − θ̂2b̂h1
b̂e1b̂
h
2 − b̂h1 b̂e2
β̂eU =
θ̂1b̂
w
2 − θ̂2b̂w1
b̂e1b̂
w
2 − b̂w1 b̂e2
If earnings (∆ log (wr)) are excluded from equation (2), then we can obtain an alternative
upper bound for βe following the same steps as above. First, note that
θ̂ ∈ Cone
(
−b̂e, b̂h
)
but
θ̂ /∈ Cone
(
−b̂ps, b̂h
)
and that Cone
(
−b̂ps, b̂h
)
is the largest cone spanned by
{
−b̂g,−b̂ps, b̂h, b̂i
}
. This leads
us to make assumptions similar to 1-3, which essentially imply that the conﬁguration of
population vectors −be,−bg,−bps,bh,bi is similar to the conﬁguration of their empirical
counterparts.
Assumption 5 θ ∈ Cone (−be,−bg,−bps,bh,bi) = Cone (−be,bh)
Assumption 6 Cone
(−be,−bg,−bps,bh,bi) = Cone (−be,bh), that is, Cone (−be,bh)
is the largest cone spanned by
{−be,−bg,−bps,bh,bi}
Assumption 7 θ /∈ Cone (−bps,bh) and Cone (−bps,bh) is the largest cone spanned by{−bg,−bps,bh,bi}
Assumption 8 −bps,bh < 0
With Assumptions 5 to 8 replacing Assumptions 1 to 4, we follow the same procedure
above to obtain the following upper bound for βe:
θ1b
ps
2 −θ2bps1
be1b
ps
2 −bps1 be2
Which can be estimated with:
β̂eU =
θ̂1b̂
ps
2 −θ̂2b̂ps1
b̂e1b̂
ps
2 −b̂ps1 b̂e2
So that β̂eU solves: (
β̂psU
β̂eU
)
=
(
b̂ps1 b̂
e
1
b̂ps2 b̂
e
2
)−1(
θ̂1
θ̂2
)
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E Bounds β̂eU and β̂
e
L as 2SLS Estimators
This section shows that equation (6) deﬁnes an estimator that is algebraically equiva-
lent to a 2SLS estimator where (1) the estimating equation stacks medium- and long-run
changes; and (2) instruments are given by RTC × Period91−00 and RTC × Period91−10.
Without loss of generality, we ignore exogenous covariates to simplify the exposition.
Suppose we want to estimate the model below, where we stack medium-run changes
(∆1) and long-run changes (∆2) and employ 2SLS with RTC × Period1 and RTC ×
Period2 as instruments. Period1 indicates if observations relate to medium-run changes
(1991-2000) and Period2 indicates if observations relate to long-run changes (1991-2010).(
∆1 log (CR)
∆2 log (CR)
)
= βe
(
∆1 log(Pe)
∆2 log(Pe)
)
+ βw
(
∆1 log(w)
∆2 log(w)
)
+ ε (12)
First stage equations are:(
∆1 log(w)
∆2 log(w)
)
=
(
RTC × Period1 RTC × Period2
)( bw1
bw2
)
+ uw
(
∆1 log(Pe)
∆2 log(Pe)
)
=
(
RTC × Period1 RTC × Period2
)( be1
be2
)
+ ue,
where bX1 is the medium-run eﬀect of RTC on variable X, and b
X
2 is the long-run eﬀect.
In matrix notation:
(
∆1 log(w) ∆1 log(Pe)
∆2 log(w) ∆2 log(Pe)
)
=
(
RTC × Period1 RTC × Period2
)( bw1 be1
bw2 b
e
2
)
+
(
uw ue
)
First stage predictions are given by:
(
̂∆1 log(w) ̂∆1 log(Pe)
̂∆2 log(w) ̂∆2 log(Pe)
)
=
(
RTC × Period1 RTC × Period2
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Z
(
b̂w1 b̂
e
1
b̂w2 b̂
e
2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
b̂
= Zb̂
By deﬁnition, the 2SLS estimator of βe and βw in equation (12) are given by the projection
coeﬃcients of
(
∆1 log (CR)
∆2 log (CR)
)
onto
(
̂∆1 log(w) ̂∆1 log(Pe)
̂∆2 log(w) ̂∆2 log(Pe)
)
= Zb̂.(
β̂w
β̂e
)2SLS
=
(
b̂′Z ′Zb̂
)−1
b̂′Z ′
(
∆1 log (CR)
∆2 log (CR)
)
The reduced-form estimates  projection coeﬃcients of (∆1 log (CR) ∆2 log (CR))
′ onto
the instruments Z  is given by:(
θ̂1
θ̂2
)
=
(
Z ′Z
)−1
Z ′
(
∆1 log (CR)
∆2 log (CR)
)
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(
Z
′
Z
)( θ̂1
θ̂2
)
= Z ′
(
∆1 log (CR)
∆2 log (CR)
)
Rewriting:
(
β̂w
β̂e
)2SLS
=
(
b̂′Z ′Zb̂
)−1
b̂′
(
Z ′Z
)( θ̂1
θ̂2
)
= b̂−1
(
θ̂1
θ̂2
)
=
(
b̂w1 b̂
e
1
b̂w2 b̂
e
2
)−1(
θ̂1
θ̂2
)
The right hand side of the above equation is equal to the right hand side of equation (6).
F Vector Conﬁguration With Demographic Controls
This appendix checks if the conﬁguration of vectors
{
−b̂e,−b̂w,−b̂g,−b̂ps, b̂h, b̂i
}
is
similar to the one pictured in Figure 4 once we add demographic controls such as changes
in urbanization rates and changes in the fraction of the population who is young (18 to
30 years old), unskilled (eighth grade completed or less) and male. Table F.1 displays the
regression results, and Figure F.1 shows the conﬁguration of these vectors, conﬁrming that
the conﬁguration of estimated vectors  controlling for demographic changes  is similar
to those in Figure 4.
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Table F.1: Medium- and Long-Run Eﬀects of RTC  Controlling for Demograhic Changes
Dep. Var.: ∆ log(CRr) ∆ log (Pe,r) ∆ log (wr) ∆ log (PSr) ∆ log (GovSpr) ∆ log (HSDropr) ∆ log (Ineqr)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
RTCr × Period91−00 -3.210** 0.650*** 0.636*** 0.673* 2.835*** -0.376* -0.346***
(1.243) (0.0682) (0.121) (0.351) (0.676) (0.193) (0.0640)
RTCr × Period91−10 -0.402 -0.0245 0.772*** 0.831 4.340*** -2.436*** -1.028***
(2.422) (0.120) (0.220) (0.544) (0.776) (0.280) (0.143)
∆ log (Share YUMr) 0.274 -0.0304 -0.241*** 0.447*** 0.581** 0.00573 0.218***
(0.439) (0.0367) (0.0554) (0.118) (0.252) (0.0546) (0.0388)
∆ log (Share Urbanr) -0.841*** 0.00940 0.00852 0.0562 0.0400 0.0204 -0.0127
(0.311) (0.0357) (0.0466) (0.213) (0.131) (0.0966) (0.0289)
Observations 822 822 822 822 815 822 822
R-squared 0.584 0.821 0.929 0.462 0.681 0.676 0.664
Notes: Decennial Census data. Standard errors (in parentheses) adjusted for 91 meso-region clusters. Unit of analysis r is a micro-
region. Observations are weighted by population. All speciﬁcations stack 1991-2000 and 1991-2010 changes and control for state-period
ﬁxed eﬀects. There are 6 missing values for government spending in column (3).
Signiﬁcant at the *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent level.
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Figure F.1: Medium versus Long-Run Eﬀects of RTC on Diﬀerent Channels  Controlling
for Demographic Changes
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The horizontal axis represents the medium-term eﬀects and the vertical axis represents long-term eﬀects
of RTCr on each outcome estimated in Tables 2, 3 and 5. See text and equation (4) for details.
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